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COMMENTS
TRUTH IN LENDING AND THE
FEDERAL CLASS ACTION
A wasp settled on a snake's head and tormented it by continually
stinging. The snake, maddened with the pain and not knowing how
else to be revenged on its tormentor, put its head under the wheel
of a wagon....
AESOP
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1974 Congress amended the Truth in Lending Act (Act),' in
part, to give succor to the long-suffering Truth in Lending (TIL)
class action.2 Prior to the amendments, individual plaintiffs had coupled
the statutory recovery provided by the Act 3 with the federal class action
Author's note: Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, the term "class action"
includes both plaintiff class actions and defendant class actions. FED. R. Civ. P.
23(a). The discussion of the Truth in Lending class action in this Comment, how-
ever, focuses only upon the situation where a class of consumer plaintiffs brings
suit against a single - or several - defendants. Therefore, general statements con-
cerning class actions in this Comment are intended to refer only to plaintiff class
actions and are not relevant to defendant class actions.
The Superintendent of Documents classification number (Sup. Doc. No.)
has been parenthetically included in this Comment wherever the standard bluebook
citation form for congressional hearings is used. See A UNIFORM SYSTEM OF CITATION
Rule 13:2 (12th ed. 1976). The Sup. Doc. No., which is the cataloguing number
used in many Depositary Libraries, provides a convenient method for locating con-
gressional hearings. See Benton, Developments in the Law - Legal Citation, 86
YALE L.J. 197, 200 & n.16 (1976) (suggesting that congressional hearings are ordi-
narily cited "inconsistently and abominably.")
1. 'The Truth in Lending Act is the first title of the Consumer Credit Pro-
tection Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1665 (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
2. The provisions regulating Truth in Lending class actions are set forth at
section 130(a) of the Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a) (Supp. V 1975) (amending 15
U.S.C. § 1640(a) (1970)) ; see notes 41-47 and accompanying text infra.
3. Section 130(a) of the Act provides that in an individual action based upon
a TIL violation, the successful plaintiff may recover twice the amount of the finance
charge imposed in the credit transaction, between minimum and maximum limits of
$100 and $1000. 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a)(2) (A) (Supp. V 1975). In addition, the
prevailing plaintiff may recover attorney's fees. Id. § 1640(a) (3). Further, by virtue
of a 1974 amendment that corrected an earlier legislative oversight, the prevailing
plaintiff may also recover his or her actual damages, if any. Id. § 1640(a) (1) (Supp.
V 1975) (amending 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a) (1970)); see Comment, The 1974 Amend-
ments to the Truth in Lending Act, 53 N.C.L. REV. 1259, 1284 (1974). The provision
allowing recovery of actual damages has been of limited utility to date. The problem
is that in the ordinary TIL case, where a consumer is given an incorrect disclosure
statement at the time the credit contract is made, it is difficult to show any actual
injury. Actual damages would, of course, exist whenever the consumer bypassed an
(418)
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device 4 in an effort to parlay individual claims of $100 to $10005 into tower-
ing class actions demanding as much as one billion dollars in statutory dam-
ages. 6 The courts, however, resisted this effort and refused to certify TIL
class actions. 7 In response, the 1974 amendments limited the potential re-
covery in a TIL class action to the lesser of $100,000 or one percent of the
net worth of the creditor.8 The passage of these amendments convinced
some that the strongest argument against the TIL class action - the possi-
bility of crippling damage awards- had been eliminated. 9 However, com-
mentators'0 and courts" were quick to point out new problems created
by the interplay of the amendments and the class action provisions of rule
23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (rule 23).12 Indeed, such were
the apparent difficulties with the TIL class action that in 1976 Congress
opportunity to secure a better credit bargain in reliance upon the defendant's defec-
tive disclosure statement. Frequently, however, the misdisclosure does not signifi-
cantly affect the consumer's ability to shop for credit. FEDERAL RESERVE BOARD,
TRUTH IN LENDING ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS FOR THE YEAR 1976, reprinted in
INSTAL. CRED. GUIDE (CCH) No. 434, pt. II, at 10 (Jan. 28, 1977). Even where
the misdisclosure might have affected the consumer's decision, it may be difficult
for the consumer to show not only that other, cheaper, credit was generally available,
but also that it was available to that particular consumer. For these reasons, actual
damages have not been particularly important in TIL litigation to date. However,
an interesting theory for assessing actual damages on a class-wide rather than indi-
vidual basis was proposed in a 1974 law review article. See Note, Recent Developments
in Truth in Lending Class Actions and Proposed Alternatives, 27 STAN. L. REV. 101,
110-17 (1974). See also Eovaldi v. First Nat'l Bank, 5 CoNs. CRED. GUIDE (CCH)
98,419, at 87,844 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 26, 1976) (assessing $27,899 in actual damages).
4. The rule governing federal class actions is set forth in rule 23 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, FED. R. CIv. P. 23. The text of rule 23 is set
out in note 49 infra, and the general requirements of the rule are discussed in the text
accompanying notes 48-59 infra.
5. See note 3 supra.
6. See Gerlach v. Allstate Ins. Co., 338 F. Supp. 642 (S.D. Fla. 1972). For a
collection of TIL actions each claiming damages in excess of $13 million, see Note,
Class Actions Under the Truth in Lending Act, 83 YALE L.J. 1410, 1411 n.12 (1974).
7. See note 39 and accompanying text infra.
8. Section 130(a) (2) (B) of the Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a) (2) (B) (Supp. V
1975) (amending 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a) (1970)). For a discussion of the legislative
history of the section, see notes 41-47 and accompanyiny text infra.
9. Brown, Propriety of Class Actions for Monetary Claims Under Truth-in-
Lending, 27 PERS. FIN. L.Q. 15, 18 (1972).
10. A number of commentators generally predicted the inadequacy of the 1974
amendments. See Davenport, Bank Class Action Defenses: The Taming of the Truth
in Lending Tiger, 92 BANKING L.J. 847, 868 (1975) ; Fischer, From Ratner to Qui
Tam: Truth-in-Lending Class Action Developments, 24 HASTINGS L.J. 813, 845-46
(1973) ; Note, supra note 3, at 120-21.
Other commentators pointed out the specific problems as they arose. See
Knepper, The Superiority Requirement of Rule 23(b)(3) in Class Actions Under the
Truth in Lending Act, 37 OHIO ST. L.J. 291 (1976) ; LeValley & Walker, Truth-in-
Lending Class Actions Under Amended Section 130, 24 KAN. L. REV. 471 (1976);
Comment, supra note 3; Comment, Goldman v. First National Bank: Adapting the
Truth in Lending Act to Class Action Requirements and the Nuances of Open End
Credit, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 635 (1977).
11. See Boggs v. Alto Trailer Sales, Inc., 511 F.2d 114 (5th Cir. 1975) ; Rollins
v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 21 FED. R. SERV. 2d 1088 (E.D. La. June 21, 1976);
Weathersby v. Fireside Thrift Co., 5 CONS. CRED. GUIDE (CCH) 98,640. 22 FED.
R. SEav. 2d 44 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 25, 1975).
12. FED. R. CIv. P. 23. For the text of rule 23, see note 49 infra.
COMMENTS
2
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 22, Iss. 2 [1977], Art. 13
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol22/iss2/13
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
further amended the damage provisions of the Act, this time increasing the
maximum potential class recovery to $500,000 or one percent of the credi-
tor's net worth.' 8 Despite the 1976 amendments, a staff attorney for the
Senate Subcommittee on Consumer Affairs ruefully commented during the
1976 senate hearings on TIL enforcement that hopes for the TIL class
action had "probably been dashed.' 4
Congress has again turned to the drafting table and may ultimately
make significant changes in the method of private TIL enforcement.' 5
13. The Consumer Leasing Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-240, § 4(3), 90 Stat.
260 (1976) (amending 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a) (2) (B) (Supp. V 1975)) (effective
March 23, 1977). That section now provides in pertinent part:
Except as otherwise provided in this section, any creditor who fails to comply
with any requirement imposed under this chapter . . .with respect to any person
is liable to such person in an amount equal to the sum of-
(1) any actual damage sustained by such person as a result of the failure;
(2) (A) in the case of an individual action twice the amount of any finance
charge in connection with the transaction except that the liability under this sub-
paragraph shall not be less than $100 nor greater than $1000; or
(B) in the case of a class action, such amount as the court may allow,
except that as to each member of the class no minimum recovery shall be appli-
cable, and the total recovery in such action shall not be more than the lesser of
$500,000 or 1 per centum of the net worth of the creditor; and
(3) in the case of any successful action to enforce the foregoing liability
the costs of the action together with a reasonable attorney's fee as determined by
the court.
Id.
14. Letter from Ralph Rohner, Staff Attorney, Senate Subcommittee on Consumer
Affairs to Senator Joseph R. Biden (Feb. 20, 1976), reprinted in Qui Tam and
Federal Reserve Board Procedures: Hearing on S. 3008 Before the Subcomm. on
Consumer Affairs of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs,
94th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1976) (Sup. Doc. No. Y4. B22/3: F31/53) [hereinafter cited
as 1976 Senate Qui Tam Hearings]. During the same hearings Senator Biden, chair-
person of the Senate Subcommittee on Consumer Affairs, characterized the "track
record" of the TIL class action after the 1974 amendments as "gloomy" and described
the present situation as "chaos." Id. at 2.
15. The following statement appears in the Senate Report accompanying the
Consumer Leasing Act of 1976:
The Committee is aware of the many difficulties surrounding the use of
class actions for civil penalties or punitive damages. . . . For this reason the
Committee, through its Subcommittee on Consumer Affairs, intends to look at
alternative private enforcement procedures such as the so-called qui tam or pri-
vate attorney general action. We are hopeful that there may be workable and
effective substitutes for the class action as a consumer enforcement device not
only for this Act but also for other similar legislation.
SENATE COMM. ON BANKING, HOUSING AND URBAN AFFAIRS, CONSUMER LEASING
ACT OF 1976, S. REP. No. 590, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1976) [hereinafter cited as
1976 SENATE REPORT]. In March 1976, the subcommittee held two days of hearings
on the qui tam concept. See 1976 Senate Qui Tam Hearings, supra note 14.
The idea of using the historic qui tam suit to enforce the TIL Act was
apparently first proposed in 1973. See Fischer, supra note 10. The qui tam suit
derives its name from the Latin phrase qui tam pro domino rege quam pro se ipso,
literally, "he who as much for the King as himself." The qui tam suit involves an
individual suing on behalf of the government. For a discussion of the historical roots
of qui tam actions, see generally Note, The History and Development of Qui Tam,
1972 WASH. U.L.Q. 81.
Under one proposal a qui tam suit could be brought by any aggrieved con-
sumer against a noncomplying creditor. The filing of the first qui tam suit would stay
all other actions against the creditor arising from the same violation. The suitor would
[VOL. 22
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However, it is submitted that recent developments in the case law, when
taken in combination with the 1976 amendments, suggest that the prob-
lems which have arisen under the Act are not judicially insurmountable.
This Comment will explore the ill-fated history of the TIL class action
both before and after the 1974 amendments, focusing in particular upon
four problem areas which have hindered the certification of TIL classes:
1) whether the ceiling on class recovery prevents -a TIL class action from
being superior to individual suits for purposes of rule 23; 2) whether the
class representative will receive a sufficient incentive to ensure that the
TIL class will be fairly and adequately represented; 3) whether a single
TIL class can be artifically split into a number of smaller classes, each re-
covering the maximum statutory damages; and 4) whether a creditor-
defendant may raise counterclaims against members of the TIL class.
After examining these problems,16 this Comment will suggest various reso-
lutions and conclude that in spite of the above-enumerated difficulties,
the TIL class action can be effectively handled by the federal courts.
Further, because the decision to certify or not to certify a class action lies
largely within the discretion of the trial court and may be influenced by
a variety of factors external to the basic procedural requirements of rule
23, this Comment also briefly examines whether there is a need for class
enforcement of the Truth in Lending Act.
II. BACKGROUND
The Truth in Lending Act was designed to expand the credit con-
sciousness of American consumers.' 7 The theory behind the Act was that
if the terminology used in credit transactions was standardized, individual
be required to give notice to the United States, which would have the opportunity to
participate. If the government elected not to proceed, the individual would continue
the suit as in an individual action; if successful, he or she could recover up to $50,000.
The recovery would then be divided between the United States and the individual
litigant, with the litigant receiving a sufficient "bounty" to make the suit attractive.
Fischer, supra note 10 at 842-45. A successful prosecution of the qui tam action
would bar all later claims for the same violation, except those for actual damages. Id.
The beauty of the qui tam suit is that the individual litigant need not send notice to
members of a "class," and need not generally comply with the procedural rules sur-
rounding the class action device.
16. The various dilemmas discussed in this Comment originally arose under the
"$100,000 or one per centum of the net worth of the creditor" liability ceiling; ac-
cordingly, they are presented in the context of that ceiling. Because the dilemmas
arise from the fact of a liability ceiling, rather than from the particular amount of
the ceiling, it has been suggested that the amendments will have little effect in
alleviating the various problems that have arisen under the 1974 amendments. Le-
Valley & Walker, supra note 10, 487 n.87. Indeed, the 1976 amendments will only
increase the potential liability of creditors who have a net worth in excess of $10
million, since the "one percent of net worth" formula has been retained. However, it
seems likely that the 1976 amendments will enlarge the number of cases in which the
plaintiff class is small enough, and the creditor large enough, so that each class
member could potentially recover the same amount through class action as in an indi-
vidual suit. See note 64 infra.
17. Section 102 of the Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1601 (1970). See generally Comment,
Truth in Lending and the Statute of Limitations, 21 VILL. L. REV. 904, 909-11 (1976).
COMMENTS
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consumers could readily compare credit costs and would dicker for the
best credit bargain.' 8  Credit-shopping consumers would, in turn, drive
lenders into competition among themselves, lowering the cost of credit
for everyone.19 The Act, and 'the regulations supporting it,20 therefore
required creditors to disclose the cost of credit in certain uniform ter-
minology in all credit transactions. 2'
When it came to enforcing the disclosure requirements, Congress
spared no remedy. Aggrieved consumers were authorized to rescind cer-
tain loan contracts if the disclosures were inadequate ;22 administrative2 s
and criminal enforcement 24 procedures were designed; and, most im-
portantly, Congress gave aggrieved consumers a private cause of action
against noncomplying creditors. 25  In order to encourage private suits,
which were viewed as primary mechanisms for enforcing the Act,28 suc-
cessful plaintiffs were authorized to recover twice the finance charge
imposed by the creditor, within limits of $100 and $1000,27 as well as
18. See B. CLARK & J. FONSECA, HANDLING CONSUMER CREDIT CASES 137-38
(1972).19. Id. at 138; see Mourning v. Family Publications Serv., Inc., 411 U.S. 356,
363 (1973).
20. Regulation Z, 12 C.F.R. §§.226.1-226.1002 (1976). Regulation Z is not a
single regulation, but a collection of all the regulations concerning TIL promulgated
by the Federal Reserve Board (Board) pursuant to the authority conferred upon
it by section 105 of the Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1604 (1970). It has been suggested that the
Board's regulations have frequently exceeded the scope of the power delegated to it.
See Comment, supra note 3, at 1259. But see Mourning v. Family Publications Serv.,
Inc., 411 U.S. 356, 369 (1972) ; Ives v. W. T. Grant Co., 522 F.2d 749, 756 (2d Cir.
1975).
21. Sections 106-107 and 121-131 of the Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1605-1606, 1631-1641
(1970). See generally B. CLARK & J. FONSECA, supra note 18, at 137-41.
22. Section 125 of the Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1635 (1970) ; Regulation Z, 12 C.F.R.
§ 226.9 (1976). For a discussion of the question of whether rescission is inconsistent
with a later damage action, see Note, Truth in Lending Act Litigation: Concurrent
Recourse to Rescission and the Civil Penalty, 43 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 840 (1975).
23. Section 108 of the Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1607 (1970). Responsibility for adminis-
trative enforcement of the Act was vested in nine federal agencies. Section 108(a)
of the Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1607(a) (1970). Each agency was given jurisdiction to secure
compliance with the Act in its own area. Section 108(a), (c) of the Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 1607(a), (c) (1970). The Federal Trade Commission was given responsibility
for compliance in all areas not specifically committed to one of the other eight agen-
cies. Section 108(c) of the Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1607(c) (1970). The efficacy of admin-
istrative enforcement has been the subject of recent hearings. See generally Over-
sight on Consumer Protection Activities of Federal Banking Agencies: Hearings
Before the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 94th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1976) (Sup. Doc. No. Y4. B22/3: C76/16) [hereinafter cited as 1976 Senate
Administrative Enforcement Hearings].
24. Section 112 of the Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1611 (1970). Criminal penalties may
be imposed only for willful and knowing violations. Id.
25. Section 130(a) of the Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a) (1970) (current version at
15 U.S.C. § 1640(a) (Supp. V 1975)).
26. Dole, Private Enforcement of Consumer Credit Legislation, 26 Bus. LAW.
915, 920 (1971). See also Comment, supra note 17, at 926. It has recently been
noted that private actions are the "chief enforcement tool" of the Act. 1976 Senate
Qui Tam Hearings, supra note 14, at 8.
27. 130(a)(1) of the Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a)(1) (1970) (current version
at 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a) (2) (A) (Supp. V 1975)).
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reasonable attorney's fees. 28 Although considerable controversy was en-
gendered by the confusing medley of enforcement devices, 29 the greatest
dispute centered around a device not mentioned in the Act - the class
action.3 0
A. The Pre-1974 Class Action
The legislative history of the TIL Act makes no mention of the class
action;31 apparently, the drafters simply failed to consider it.82 Never-
theless, within a short period following the passage of the Act, numerous
TIL class actions were filed around the country.83 These actions were
for the most part unsuccessful. The problem was simple enough: if, for
example, each class member in a class of 30,000 individuals recovered the
minimum $100 damages, the class recovery would be three million dollars,
even before calculation of the attorney's fees and actual damages.3 4 If a
medium- to large-sized class recovered the maximum damages, very few
creditors could absorb the loss.
It was not surprising, then, that in Ratner v. Chemical Bank New
York Trust Co. (Ratner II),35 the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York refused to certify a class of 130,000 con-
sumer plaintiffs.8 6 Explaining his conclusion that the proposed class action
was not "superior" to other forms of recovery and thus did not satisfy
the requirements of rule 23(b) (3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure,3 7 Judge Frankel stated: "[Tlhe proposed recovery of $100 each for
some 130,000 class members would be a horrendous, possibly annihilating
28. 130(a)(2) of the Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a)(2) (1970) (current version at
15 U.S.C. § 1640(a) (3) (Supp. V 1975)). Section 130(a) of the Act was amended
in 1974 to provide for recovery of actual damages as well as the civil penalty.
Section 130(a) (1) of the Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a) (1) (Supp. V 1975) ; see note 3
supra.
29. See Haynes v. Logan Furn. Mart, Inc., 503 F.2d 1161, 1163 (7th Cir. 1974).
30. For law review commentary on the controversy surrounding the TIL class
action before the 1974 amendments, see Brown, supra note 9, at 16-18; Fischer, supra
note 10, at 833-38; Note, Class Actions Under the Truth-in-Lending Act, 47 NoTRE
DAME LAW. 1305, 1308-14 (1972) ; Note, supra note 6, at 1412-20.
31. Wilcox v. Commerce Bank, 474 F.2d 336, 343-44 (10th Cir. 1973).
32. Equal Credit Opportunity Act Amendments and Consumer Leasing Act -
1795: Hearings on S. 483, S. 1900, S. 1927, S 1961, and H.R. 5616 Before the Sub-
comm. on Consumer Affairs of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban
Affairs, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1975) (Sup. Doc. No. Y4, B22/3; C86/3/975) (re-
marks of Sen. Biden) [hereinafter cited as 1975 Senate Consumer Leasing Act
Hearings].
33. One estimate indicates that 18 TIL class actions were filed in the first 14
months of the Act's existence. Note, supra note 6, at 1412.
34. For cases seeking far greater recoveries, see ;Note, supra note 6, at 1411 n.12.
35. 54 F.R.D. 412 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
36. Id. at 416.
37. In order to satisfy the requirements of a 23(b)(3) class action, it must
appear to the court that the class action "is superior to other available methods for
the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy." FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3).
For a discussion of the other requirements of a 23(b) (3) class action, see notes
48-59 and accompanying text infra.
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punishment, unrelated to any damage to the purported class or to any
benefit to the defendant .... 38s During the three years following Ratner II,
court after court agreed with Judge Frankel's assessment of the situation
and refused to certify TIL class actions.8 9 Indeed, as one commentator
accurately observed, "Ratner II was, in a very real sense, the beginning
and end of the Truth-in-Lending class action under the original version
of [the Act] .",40
B. The 1974 Amendments
In its annual report to Congress on the Truth in Lending effort,41
the Federal Reserve Board (Board) recommended in 1972 that Congress
amend the Act to place a ceiling on class action liability so that the ra-
tionale of Ratner II would no longer prevent the certification of TIL class
actions. 42 In 1973, during the Senate hearings on the matter, the Board
explained its request, stating:
The Board believes that potential class action liability is an
important encouragement to the voluntary compliance which is so
necessary to insure nationwide adherence to uniform disclosure ...
[The threat of class action exposure] elevates a possible Truth in
Lending lawsuit from the ineffective "nuisance" category to the type
of suit which has enough sting in it to insure that management will
strive with diligence to achieve compliance.
48
Most of the discussion in the 1973 Senate hearings was devoted not
to the desirability of TIL class actions, but to the appropriate limitation
on liability.44 Ultimately, Congress decided upon a maximum liability of
38. 54 F.R.D. at 416.
39. The cases are collected in Note, supra note 6, at 1415 n.31.
40. LeValley & Walker, supra note 10, at 475. The single case to reject Ratner
II's analysis was Eovaldi v. First Nat'l Bank, 57 F.R.D. 545 (N.D. Ill. 1972).
Noting that the minimum class recovery totaled $17 million, the court suggested that
if the plaintiff did not waive the $100 minimum per person recovery, application of
the class action rule would raise constitutional problems. Id. at 548. The court
agreed, however, to certify the class on the condition that the plaintiff explore the
possibility of waiving the minimum recovery. Id.
41. The Board is required to submit an annual report to Congress on the current
developments in TIL enforcement. Section 114 of the Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1613 (1970).
42. FEDERAL RESERVE BOARD, TRUTH IN LENDING ANNUAL REPORT To CONGRESS
FOR THE YEAR 1972, at 31 (1973).
43. Inaccurate and Unfair Billing Practices: Hearings on S. 1630 and S. 914
Before the Subcomm. on Consumer Credit of the Senate Comm. on Banking. Housing
and Urban Affairs, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 54 (1973) (Sup. Doe. No. Y4. B22/3: B49)
(memorandum comments of the Board) [hereinafter cited as 1973 Senate Hearings].
44. LeValley & Walker, supra note 10, at 476. The choice was between: 1) the
greater of $50,000 or one percent of the creditor's net worth; and 2) the lesser of
$100,000 or one percent of the creditor's net worth. See SENATE COMM. ON BANKING,
HOUSING AND UR3AN AFFAIRS, TRUTH IN LENDING ACT AMENDMENTS, S. REP. No.
278, 93d Cong., Ist Sess. 35-37 (1973) (additional views of Sens. Proxmire and
Hathaway) [hereinafter cited as 1973 SENATE REPORT].
[VOL. 22
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the lesser of $100,000 or one percent of the creditor's net worth. 45 It was
assumed that this ceiling would protect creditors from the crushing lia-
bilities noted in Ratner II and thereby free the courts to certify class
actions where they were otherwise appropriate.4 As was recently noted,
"Congress, in so amending [the civil liability provision], recognized that
courts were not certifying class actions and that there was a need to en-
courage voluntary creditor compliance via potential class action liability. '47
III. TRUTH IN LENDING AND FEDERAL RULE 23:
FOUR DILEMMAS
Shortly after the 1974 amendments were enacted, it became apparent
that Congress had not resolved all of the difficulties inherent in the TIL
class action.48 In order for a federal court to certify a class action, the
strictures of rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure must be
satisfied.49 Under rule 23(a) it must appear that: 1) the class is so
45. Section 130(a) (2) (B) of the Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a) (2) (B) (Supp. V
1975) (current version at Pub. L. No. 94-240 § 4(3), 90 Stat. 260 (1976)). For a
discussion of the subsequent increase in the maximum liability, see note 13 supra.
It should be emphasized that $100,000 or one percent of net worth was the
maximum recovery. In determining the amount of the class award, section 130(a) of
the Act provides that the court shall consider, inter alia, the following factors: 1) the
amount of actual damages awarded; 2) the frequency and persistence of the creditor's
failure to comply; 3) the creditor's resources; 4) the number of persons adversely
affected; and 5) the extent to which the violation was intentional. 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a)
(Supp. V 1975). Some guidance as to the application of the above factors is found
in the Senate report on an earlier bill to amend the Act which contained class action
provisions identical to the ones in the bill that ultimately was passed:
While the Committee expects the court will award higher sums to the extent
found appropriate after considering the pertinent factors, including those listed
above, a court does not have to find a violation was intentional in order to assess
a meaningful penalty upon a creditor to induce compliance with the legislation.
1973 SENATE REPORT, supra note 44, at 15.
46. H.R. REP. No. 1429, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 37, reprinted in [1971] U.S. CODE
CONG. & An. NEWs 6153.
47. Agostine v. Sidcon Corp., 69 F.R.D. 437, 447 (E.D. Pa. 1975). For a dis-
cussion of Agostine, see notes 163-67 and accompanying text infra.
48. See note 10 supra.
49. Rule 23 provides in pertinent part:
(a) Prerequisites to a Class Action. One or more members of a class may
sue or be sued as representative parties on behalf of all only if (1) the class
is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable, (2) there are ques-
tions or law or fact common to the class, (3) the claims or defenses of the repre-
sentative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class, and (4) the
representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.
(b) Class Actions Maintainable. An action may be maintained as a class
action if the prerequisites of subdivision (a) are satisfied, and in addition:
(1) the prosecution of separate actions by or against individual members
of the class would create a risk of
(A) inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual mem-
bers of the class which would establish incompatible standards of conduct for
the party opposing the class, or
(B) adjudications with respect to individual members of the class which
would as a practical matter be dispositive of the interests of the other members
8
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numerous that joinder of all members would not be practicable ;5o 2) com-
mon questions of law or fact pervade the individual claims of class mem-
bers ;51 3) the representative of the class presents claims typical of those
of the class ;52 and 4) the class representative will fairly and adequately
protect the interests of the class.53 If all four preconditions appear to be
satisfied, the class action will be allowed if it fits under any one of the
three provisions of rule 23(b). 54 While there has been some attempt to
bring TIL class actions under rule 23(b) (1) or 23(b) (2),r 5 the main
focus has been upon rule 23 (b) (3).56 Under rule 23 (b) (3), a class action
will be allowed if: 1) the questions of law or fact that are common to the
class predominate over collateral questions ;57 and 2) it appears that the
class action device is superior to other methods for the "fair and efficient
adjudication of the controversy."58
TIL class actions have had little difficulty satisfying the requirements
of numerosity and commonality under rule 23(a), as well as the require-
ment that common questions predominate under 23(b). 59 However, the
not parties to the adjudications or substantially impair or impede their ability to
protect their interests ; or
(2) the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds
generally applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief
or corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the class as a whole; or
(3) the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to the members
of the class predominate over any questions affecting only indivdual members,
and that a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and
efficient adjudication of the controversy.
FED. R. Civ. P. 23.
50. Id. 23(a) (1) (numerosity).
51. Id. 23(a) (2) (commonality).
52. Id. 23(a) (3) (typicality).
53. Id. 23 (a) (4) (fair and adequate representation).
54. Id. 23 (b) ; see note 49 supra.
55. See Chevalier v. Baird Say. Ass'n, 72 F.R.D. 140, 156-57 (E.D. Pa. 1976);
Ratner v. Chemical Bank N.Y. Trust Co., 54 F.R.D. 412, 414-15 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
For discussion of the applicability of rule 23(b) (1) and/or rule 23(b) (2) to TIL
class actions, see Fischer, supra note 10, at 824-28; LeValley & Walker, supra note
10, at 482-84. (For criticism of the latter article's approach to the problem, see
notes 152-58 infra.
56. Knepper, supra note 10, at 295-96.
57. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b) (3).
58. Id. In determining whether common questions predominate and whether the
class action is superior, the rule specifies certain pertinent factors :
(A) the interest of members of the class in individually controlling the prose-
cution or defense of separate actions ;
(B) the extent and nature of any litigation concerning the controversy already
commenced by or against members of the class;
(C) the desirability or undesirability of concentrating the litigation of the
claims in the particular forum;
(D) the difficulties likely to be encountered in the management of a class
action.
Id. 23(b) (3) (A)-(D).
59. Since the gravamen of a TIL cause of action is a creditor's failure to pro-
vide an accurate and understandable disclosure statement, it follows that where the
disclosures are made in a widely distributed form contract, class claims will be
9
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1974 amendments created a number of difficulties with respect to the
fairness and adequacy of the class representation on the one hand, and
the superiority of the class action device on the other.
A. Reduced Recovery
Although a consumer may always recover at least $100 for a TIL
violation by suing individually, class recovery is limited to the lesser of
$100,000 or one percent of the creditor's net worth, even when the class
of plaintiffs is of substantial size. The result is that a class member may
recover a lesser amount than a plaintiff who institutes an individual action.
For example, assume that a creditor with a net worth of ten million
dollars is sued by a class of 10,000 members for violating the Act. Since
one percent of the creditor's net worth is $100,000, the class members'
shares would appear to be limited to a maximum of $10 per person.60 Even
where the plaintiff class is as small as 250 individuals and the creditor is
very large, the maximum recovery of a class member would be $400,1 com-
pared to a potential recovery of twice the finance charge up to $1000 in an
individual suit. Furthermore, a $400 recovery assumes that the class
receives the maximum award permitted by statute. However, the 1974
amendments give the courts considerable discretion in determining the
amount of the recovery. 62 It has been pointed out that courts may be
reluctant to award the maximum amount unless the TIL violation is
egregious.63 In light of the likelihood that the class member's recovery
numerous and, in most cases, identical. See, e.g., Eovaldi v. First Natl Bank, 57
F.R.D. 545 (N.D. IIl. 1972).
The requirement that the class representative's claim be typical of the claims
of the class members has traditionally been subsumed within the requirements that
there be a class-wide common questions of law or fact, and that the representative
fairly and adequately represent the class. 3B MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTIcE 23.06-2,
at 23-325 (2d ed. 1976). Recently, however, class certification was denied in a TIL
class action because of a lack of typicality, where the representative, who had dealt
with only one of the pawn shop defendants, attempted to represent a class suing six
pawnshops. La Mar v. H & B Novelty & Loan Co., 489 F.2d 461 (9th Cir. 1973).
See also Weiner v. Bank of King of Prussia, 358 F. Supp. 684 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
60. If the creditor's net worth is only $1 million, the class member's recovery
would be a single dollar.
61. If a creditor has a net worth greater than $10 million, the maximum penalty
would be $100,000. Divided by 250 members, this would yield $400 per class member.
62. See note 45 supra.
63. 1975 Senate Consumer Leasing Act Hearings, supra note 32, at 214 (remarks
of Sheldon Feldman, Ass't Dir. for Special Statutes, Fed. Trade Comm.) In fact,
it is in these discretionary factors that the creditor's greatest protection is found. A
court hearing an individual suit has no discretion in awarding damages and cannot
distinguish between technical and substantial violations. See section 130 (a) (2) (A)
of the Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a) (2) (A) (Supp. V 1975). In the class action situa-
tion, however, the court may tailor the award according to the severity of the
violation. 1975 Senate Consumer Leasing Act Hearings, supra note 32, at 214 (re-
marks of Sheldon Feldman) ; FEDERAL RESERvE BOARD, TRUTH-IN-LENDING ANNUAL
REPORT TO CONGRESS FOR THE YEAR 1973, reprinted in INSTAL. CRED. GUIDE (CCH)
No. 271 pt. II, at 10 (Jan. 16, 1974).
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will be reduced in a class action,64 it has been argued that the class action
is not superior to individual action for purposes of rule 23 and that certifi-
cation of nearly all TIL class actions should be denied. 65
B. Incentive to' Represent a Class
If a TIL class action will yield a lesser recovery than an individual
suit, a question arises as to who will have the incentive to lead a class
action. If the plaintiff can bring an individual suit which is quicker,
easier, 66 and potentially more profitable,67 it would seem that few plaintiffs
would bother with the class action, especially in light of the United States
Supreme Court's 1974 decision in Eisen v. Jacquelin & Carlisle,6 s which
held that the class representative must assume the initial burden of notify-
ing all the members of the proposed class.69
Besides discouraging the individual from bringing a class action, the
1974 amendments place plaintiff's counsel in an awkward position. On
the one hand, the attorney is compelled to advance the best interest of his
or her client.70 On the other hand, the attorney's fees resulting from a
class action may well be substantially greater than those from an individual
action.71 It has thus been contended that the attorney will be tempted to
recommend the class action route to the plaintiff despite its potentially
smaller recovery.72 The possibility of such professional misconduct has
64. There is, of course, a narrow group of cases in which the individual class
member's recovery might be the same whether the vehicle of redress is an individual
or a class suit. The 1976 amendments to section 130(a) (2) (B) somewhat expands
this group. See Pub. L. No. 94-240, § 4(3), 90 Stat. 260 (1976); note 13 supra.
It is important to note, however, that because of the discretion involved in the class
award, a class member can never be assured of a recovery equal to the amount which
would be recovered in an individual suit. See note 63 supra.
65. 'Two commentators have recently observed that "[tlhe reduction in potential
recovery for the representative plaintiff and all putative class members in most actions
under amended section 130 must be considered an 'undesirable result' that renders the
utilization of the Rule 23 mechanism inappropriate." LeValley & Walker, supra
note 10, at 487; see Weathersby v. Fireside Thrift Co., 5 CONS. CRED. GUIDE (CCH)
1198,640, 22 FED. R. SERV. 2d 44 (N.D. Cal., Feb. 25, 1975).
66. See Comment, supra note 17, at 922 & n.11.
67. See text accompanying notes 60-65 supra.
68. 417 U.S. 156 (1974). In Eisen, the United States Supreme Court held that
in a rule 23(b) (3) class action, individual notice must be sent to each class member
who could be identified through reasonable effort. Id. at 177. The Court further
held that the plaintiff must ordinarily bear the expense of mailing the class notices.
Id. at 178.
69. Id. at 175. The impact of Eisen may be considerably reduced in TIL class
actions by utilizing the creditor's billing system to send the class notice. LeValley &
Walker, supra note 10, at 488-89.
70. ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHIcs No. 7.
71. Attorney's fees are not limited by the "$100,000 or one percent of net worth"
provision. Section 130(a) (3) of the Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a) (3) (Supp. V 1975).
72. One attorney testified before the Senate Subcommittee on Consumer Affairs
as follows:
I think that lawyers, and this is where the judges should be more concerned
about the ethics of the lawyer, . . . are bringing class actions right out in the
truth-in-lending area and not telling their clients that you . . . are entitled to
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been cited as another reason why the class action is not "superior" to other
methods of adjudication of the controversy. 73 Of course, this problem
would not arise in cases where the plaintiff was also the class attorney,
but in TIL cases the courts have refused to allow attorney-plaintiffs to
represent the class. 74
C. Multiple Classes
While the 1974 amendments limited recovery in a class action to
$100,000 or one percent of net worth, they failed to specify what constitutes
a proper TIL "class." Where an institutional lender violates the Act,
there may be 50,000 persons, scattered throughout a number of states, who
received the same defective disclosure statement. If an individual brought
a class action on behalf of all Pennsylvania residents who received the
defective form, might a separate class action be brought on behalf of
similarly situated New York residents? It has been suggested, on the
one hand, that if numerous small TIL "classes" were able to proceed to
judgment, the $100,000 or one percent of net worth limitation on class
action exposure would become meaningless, and the creditor would be
subject to the same horrendous potential liability as existed before the
1974 amendments.75 On the other hand, if the class representative were
forced to sue on behalf of all 50,000 individuals who received the same
loan disclosure statement in the preceding one-year period, 76 the burden
of mailing the Eisen notice77 might be too great for even the most well-
intentioned plaintiff to bear.7 8
twice that finance charge up to $1,000. But if we get to a consumer class action
under this new law, and if there are over 1,000 plaintiffs, for example, you may
not get more than $100.
I think that is a very serious burden that the lawyers ought to be considering.
1975 Senate Consumer Leasing Act Hearings, supra note 32, at 306 (testimony of
Benny Kass, Esq.)
73. LeValley & Walker, supra note 10, at 481-82.
74. See, e.g., Eovaldi v. First Nat'l Bank, 57 F.R.D. 545 (N.D. Ill. 1972) ; Shields
v. First Nat'l Bank, 56 F.R.D. 442 (D. Ariz. 1972); Shield v. Valley Nat'l Bank,
56 F.R.D. 448 (D. Ariz. 1971). The courts appear to have been motivated by the fear
that attorneys would actively search for TIL violations upon which to sue. Id.
75. LeValley & Walker, supra note 10, at 490-92.
76. The private cause of action created by the Act is subject to a one-year statute
of limitations. Section 130(e) of the Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1640(e) (1970). See generally
Comment, supra note 17.
77. See text accompanying notes 68 & 69 supra.
78. As the size of the class grows, problems of manageability may also increase;
in an ordinary TIL action, however, this would not generally create a substantial
problem. The ordinary TIL suit is founded upon an omitted or mistaken disclosure
in a standard, widely distributed, form contract. The violation will usually be
identical in each class member's case. As one commentator has noted: "[P]roof
of a TIL violation requires very little evidence and few witnesses. Compliance can gen-
erally be determined from a single sheet of paper .... ." Comment, supra note 17,
at 922 (footnotes omitted). The author further states that in TIL cases there is
often "no issue of material fact and the question of compliance is resolved on motion
for summary judgment." Id. at 922 n.111.
COMMENTS
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D. Compulsory Counterclaims
Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a counterclaim is com-
pulsory if it arises from the' same "transaction or occurrence" which
constitutes the subject matter of the plaintiff's claim. 79 When a plaintiff
brings a TIL action in federal court,80 the question arises whether the
creditor must file a counterclaim for the amount of any outstanding
indebtedness in order to preserve that claim from being barred by the
doctrine of res judicata.8 ' The question is important because the test
for deciding whether a counterclaim is compulsory is identical to the
test used to determine whether the federal court has ancillary jurisdiction
over the state claim: that is, does the defendant's state claim arise from
the same "transaction or occurrence" as the plaintiff's federal claim.82 If
79. FED. R. Civ. P. 13(a). All other counterclaims under the federal rules are
deemed permissive and may be raised or reserved without fear of later being barred.
Id. 13(b).
80. Section 130(e) of the Act gives state and federal courts concurrent juris-
diction over TIL actions. 15 U.S.C. § 1640(e) (1970).
81. The precise relationship between the compulsory counterclaim rule and the
doctrine of res judicata is not clear. While it is generally accepted that a litigant's
failure to raise a compulsory counterclaim will prevent him or her from raising the
claim in the future, there is no agreement on the underlying rationale. The majority
of courts have reasoned that it is the doctrine of res judicata that bars later assertion
of the claim. See, e.g., Great Lakes Rubber Corp. v. Herbert Cooper Co., 286 F.2d
631 (3d Cir. 1961). Other courts, however, have relied upon the more flexible
waiver or estoppel theory. See, e.g., Dow Chem. Co. v. Melton Corp., 281 F.2d 292
(4th Cir. 1960). For discussion of the theories involved, see 6 C. WRIGHT & A.
MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1417 (1971). In the present situation it
makes no difference which theory is followed.
82. A federal court has ancillary jurisdiction to hear a state law claim only if
it arises out of the same transaction or occurrence as a claim properly before the
federal court. Moore v. New York Cotton Exch., 270 U.S. 593, 608-09 (1926).
Therefore, if the creditor's counterclaim on the delinquent account does not spring
from the same transaction or occurrence as the debtor-plaintiff's TIL action, the
creditor's counterclaim cannot be entertained by a federal court. In effect, this would
require the creditor to institute a separate suit in state court in order to recover the
amount owed by the debtor.
Creditors would generally prefer to assert their counterclaims in federal
court for two reasons: 1) it is more convenient to decide the contract claim at the
same time as the TIL claim; and 2) the presence of a counterclaim tends to chill
the plaintiff's enthusiasm in prosecuting his or her claim, thus giving the creditor
settlement leverage. For similar reasons, TIL plaintiffs would prefer that their
creditors be unable to assert their counterclaims in federal court. The harder it is
for the creditor to collect on the contract claim, the greater the settlement leverage
in the hands of the TIL plaintiff. Of course, if the consumer has already sued in
federal court, it is to his or her advantage to argue that the creditor, by failing to
assert a "compulsory" counterclaim, can no longer sue for the outstanding indebtedness.
It should be noted that a perfect congruence does not exist between the test
for determining the ancillary jurisdiction of the federal court and the test for deciding
whether a counterclaim is compulsory. Rule 13(a) (1) and (2) lists two situations
where counterclaims which arise from the same transaction or occurrence as the
plaintiff's claim are not compulsory. See FED. R. CIv. P. 13(a) (1), (2). In these
situations the counterclaims fall within the ancillary jurisdiction of a federal court,
despite the fact that they are not compulsory.
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the creditor's counterclaim is not compulsory under the same transaction
or occurrence test, it will also not be within the ancillary jurisdiction of
the court and cannot be raised in federal court unless supported by an
independent basis of jurisdiction.8 3
While initial authority appeared to support the proposition that the
creditor's counterclaim is not compulsory, 84 recent decisions have reached a
contrary conclusion. In Mims v. Dixie Finance Corp.,8 5 the United States
District Court for the Northern District of Georgia, sitting en banc,
overruled a line of its earlier decisions8 6 and held the creditor's counter-
claim to be compulsory within the meaning of rule 13(a).87 The court
stated :
Manifestly, defendant's counterclaims arise out of the same trans-
action as plaintiff's Truth-in-Lending claims. Both claims derive
their basis from the same credit transaction. When the parties exe-
cuted that credit transaction, certain legal obligations were imposed
upon them. The creditor was obligated to extend credit and make
certain disclosures in conformity with the Consumer Credit Protection
Act. On the other hand, the debtor executed a promissory note and
promised to make scheduled monthly payments thereon. The claims
of both parties are logically related in that they are offshoots of the
same basic transaction; namely, an extension of credit. To arrive at
a contrary conclusion would ignore judicial economy which underlies
the purpose of a compulsory counterclaim. 8
Apart from the impact of the Mims decision upon individual TIL
suits,8 9 it is possible that Mims signifies difficulties for the TIL class action in
federal court. Federal courts have been understandably reluctant to become
involved with numerous state law debt collection suits.90 In a situation
83. Thus, if the creditor counterclaimed for a sum greater than $10,000, and
the creditor and debtor were of diverse citizenship, the creditor could raise the
counterclaim even though it was not compulsory. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1970) ; FED.
R. Cr. P. 13 (b).
84. Ball v. Connecticut Bank & Trust Co., 404 F. Supp. 1, 3-4 (D. Conn. 1975);
Roberts v. National School of Radio & Television Broadcasting, 374 F. Supp. 1266,
1270-71 (N.D. Ga. 1974).
85. 21 FED. R. SERv. 2d 1042 (N.D. Ga. May 6, 1976) (en banc).
86. Roberts v. National School of Radio & Television Broadcasting, 374 F. Supp.
1266 ('N.D. Ga. 1974); Buford v. American Fin. Co., 333 F. Supp. 1243 (N.D. Ga.
1973); Russell v. Credit Thrift of America, Civ. No. 17918 (N.D. Ga. Aug. 2,
1973); Brown v. Commercial Credit Plan, Civ. No. 17113 (N.D. Ga. Feb. 2, 1973).
For post-Mims cases relying upon Roberts, see note 164 and accompanying text infra.
87. 21 FED. R. SERV. 2d at 1046.
88. Id. at 1047-48. The court suggested a further rationale for its decision: the
same physical evidence would be required for the adjudication of the two claims.
That is, in order to decide either the TIL or the contract claim, it would be necessary
to examine the instrument containing the contract and the TIL disclosure statement.
Id. at 1046; see Comment, supra note 17, at 922.
89. See note 82 supra.
90. See, e.g., Crotchet v. Avis Rent A Car Sys., Inc., 56 F.R.D. 549, 552-56
(S.D.N.Y. 1972).
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where a defendant asserts numerous compulsory counterclaims against
members of the plaintiff class, the court may refuse to certify the class
action on the grounds either that common questions do not predominate
or that the class action is not superior to other methods of adjudication.9 1
IV. TRUTH IN LENDING AND RULE 23: SOLUTIONS
The commentary concerning the viability of federal TIL class actions
following the 1974 amendments has been uniformly negative. 92 Indeed,
the authors of a well-researched article on the subject have stated flatly
that Congress' objective of revitalizing the TIL class action has failed.e
91. See notes 58 & 59 and accompanying text supra.
92. See, e.g., Knepper, supra note 10, at 291. The United States District Court
for the Northern District of California commented ruefully that "Congress may well
have hoped that class actions would in some cases be maintained, but it did not pro-
vide a mechanism that would permit the courts to handle such actions." Weathersby
v. Fireside Thrift Co., 5 CoNs. CRED. GUIDE (CCH) 1 98,640, at 88,181, 22 FED. R.
SERV. 2d 44, 48 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 25, 1975).
93. LeValley & Walker, supra note 10, at 494. It is suggested that despite their
thorough treatment of the subject matter, the authors reach several conclusions that
are misleading. First, LeValley and Walker argue that section 130(a) (2) (B) of the
Act (see note 13 supra) limits recovery in a class action to $100,000 or one percent
of net worth regardless of the actual damages to the plaintiff class. LeValley &
Walker, supra note 10, at 478 & n.38. Their reading is based upon the technical
difference in the language of sections 13 0(a) (2) (A) and 130(a) (2) (B). Under
section 130(a) (1) an individual litigant can recover his or her actual. damages, plus
any amount provided in section 130(a) (2). 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a) (1), (2) (Supp. V
1975). In an individual action, section 130(a) (2) (A) provides for a penalty recovery
of twice the finance charge. Id. § 1640(a) (2) (A) (Supp. V 1975). Further, the
minimum and maximum recoveries under this subparagraph are $100 and $1000 re-
spectively. Id. In a class action, section 130(a) (2) (B) provides recovery of the
amount that the court allows, except that the maximum recovery is $100,000 or one
percent of the creditor's net worth. Id. § 1640(a) (2) (B) (Supp. V 1975). Unlike
section 130(a) (2) (A), section 130(a) (2) (B) does not use the words "under this
subparagraph" to qualify the maximum class recovery. LeValley and Walker there-
fore conclude that the statute sets an absolute ceiling of $100,000 or one percent of
the net worth of the creditor. LeValley & Walker supra note 10, at 478 n.39.
The legislative history on this point is unequivocal. The Senate report on
S. 2101, which contained the same civil liability provisions as the amendments that
were enacted in 1974, stated: "[T]he Committee . . . decided to place an aggregate
limitation on a creditor's class action liability for violations not involving actual dam-
ages" 1973 SENATE REPORT, supra note 44, at 15 (emphasis added). The same report
provides the following summary of the proposed amendments:
Under Section 130, as amended by this section, consumers can bring civil
actions against creditors who violate the disclosure .. .provisions of the Act.
Consumers are entitled to recover actual damages, court costs, reasonable attor-
ney fees and such additional amounts as provided in the Act or allowed by the
court. . . . In the case of a class action, the members of the class can recover
such additional amounts as the court may allow, but not more than the lesser of
$100,000 or 1% of the creditor's net worth. (These limitations do not apply to
the amount of any actual damages which can be awarded in a class action suit
under the Act.)
Id. at 25 (emphasis added).
Aside from the legislative history, the authors' reading of section 130(a)
(2) (B) as limiting recovery to $100,000 or one percent of net worth regardless of the
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After pointing out several of the problems discussed above, they conclude
that the class action "remains as unlikely a method of enforcing the Truth-
in-Lending Act as it was immediately following Ratner 11."
o4
Apparently, Congress believed the commentary, because in the spring
of 1976 it began hearings on the possibility of replacing the class action
device with the qui tam suit as an alternative for TIL enforcement. 95
Leading off those hearings, Senator Joseph R. Biden, Chairperson of the
Senate Subcommittee on Consumer Affairs, commented that the combina-
tion of the $100,000 or one percent of net worth ceiling and the Supreme
Court's Eisen decision 6 "may have mortally wounded the class action as a
Truth in Lending enforcement device. .. .
It is submitted that the problems frustrating the implementation of
TIL class actions are by no means judicially insurmountable. Indeed, a
recent line of cases has allowed TIL class actions to proceed despite the
problems pointed out above.98
actual damages ignores the factors that the statute directs a court to consider in
making a class award. Section 130(a) provides:
In determining the amount of award in any class action, the court shall consider
among other relevant factors, the amount of actual damages awarded, the fre-
quency and persistence of failures of compliance by the creditor, the resources
of the creditor, the number of persons adversely affected, and the extent to
which the creditor's failure of compliance was intentional.
15 U.S.C. § 1640(a) (Supp V 1975) (emphasis added). This implies that the amount
of actual damages and the class award are separate items.
LeValley and Walker's reading of the statute to limit class recovery abso-
lutely to $100,000 or one percent of net worth would logically deny attorney fees
and costs over $100,000 as well, yet the Act clearly intended to provide full reimburse-
ment of attorney fees. Section 130(a) (3) of the Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a) (3) (Supp.
V 1975). In Eovaldi v. First Nat'l Bank, 5 CoNs. CRED. GUIDE (CCH) 11 98,419
(N.D. Ill. Jan. 26, 1976), the court awarded the successful TIL class $27,899 actual
damages, $100,000 under section 130(a) (2) (B), plus costs and reasonable attorney's
fees. 5 CONS. CrED. GUIDE (CCH) f" 98,419 at 87,843.
Other conclusions of LeValley and Walker are also questionable. For a
discussion of their contention that rule 23(b) (1) (A) gives the defendant facing a
TIL class action the right to force the plaintiff to expand the class to include all
individuals with similar complaints, see notes 152-58 and accompanying text infra.
For a response to the authors' statement that "the values [Truth in Lending] em-
bodies are simply not important enough to make the availability of the class action
vehicle an overwhelmingly crucial matter," LeValley & Walker, supra note 10, at
494, see notes 202-14 and accompanying text infra.
94. LeValley & Walker, supra note 10, at 494.
95. 1976 Senate Qui Tam Hearings, supra note 14. For a brief explanation of
the qui tam suit, see note 15 supra. For a more detailed discussion, see Fischer,
supra note 10.
96. For a brief discussion of Eisen, see notes 68 & 69 and accompanying text
supra.
97. 1976 Senate Qui Tam Hearings, supra note 14, at 2 (remarks of Sen. Biden).
98. Chevalier v. Baird Say. Ass'n, 72 F.R.D. 140 (E.D. Pa. 1976); Eovaldi v.
First Nat'l Bank, 5 CONS. CRED. GUIDE (CCH) 11 98,419 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 26, 1976)
(Eovaldi II) ; Postow v. Oriental Bldg. Ass'n, 390 F. Supp. 1130 (D.D.C. 1975);
Vickers v. Home Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n -...... Misc. 2d _, 386 N.Y.S.2d 291 (Sup. Ct.
1976). See also Goldman v. First Nat'l Bank, 532 F.2d 10 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
45 U.S.L.W. 3254 (Oct. 5, 1976); Agostine v. Sidcon Corp., 69 F.R.D. 437 (E.D.
Pa. 1975).
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A. Reduced Recovery
In Chevalier v. Baird Savings Association,9 9 the plaintiff sought to
bring a TIL action on behalf of a class of similarly aggrieved consumers. 100
The plaintiffs desired no more than their pro rata share of the class re-
covery. 1 1 In opposing certification of the class, the defendants argued
that the individual class members were likely to receive less than the
$100 minimum they could recover in individual suits, and therefore, the
class action device was not "superior" to other methods of recovery.' 02
Chief Judge Lord of the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania rejected the creditors' argument. 03 Noting that
the 1974 amendments, which set a ceiling on the creditor's class exposure,
were intended to "remove an impediment to the use of class actions,"' 0 4
he stated that "[t]o hold now that the amendments prevent a class action
from being maintained would result in a judicially-decreed Catch 22."'15
Chief Judge Lord reasoned that since each class member would receive
notice of the action and would have an opportunity to opt out, the class
would receive sufficient protection if the class notice clearly explicated
that a greater recovery might be obtained by individual action.10
It is submitted that common sense supports this viewpoint. To the
extent that a person brings an individual action to redress a TIL violation,
he or she makes an unavoidable investment of time and energy in the
cause1° 7 and bears the risk of financial loss if not victorious. 0 8 A class
member, by contrast, is generally a silent partner in the litigation being
carried on by the representative. 10 As Chief Judge Lord recognized,
99. 72 F.R.D. 140 (E.D. Pa. 1976).
100. Id. at 143-44.
101. Id. at 152.
102. Id. Apparently, at least one of the several classes that was represented num-
bered more than 1,000 persons. Id.
103. Id. at 153.
104. Id. For a discussion of the legislative history of the 1974 amendments,
see notes 41-47 and accompanying text supra.
105. 72 F.R.D. at 153. See also J. HELLER, CATCH 22, at 46-47 (1961) (remarks
of Dr. Daneeka).
106. Id. Chief Judge Lord stated: "We would expect such notice to state clearly
whether a reduced award is certain (i.e., where the class exceeds 1,000) or merely
possible (class under 1,000). The choice of opting out and the rights and liabilities
arising therefrom should also be explained in clear, concise, nontechnical language."
Id. at 153 n.35.
107. In fact, it is the substantiality of this investment that has led commentators
to argue that the incentive to sue in individual suits is not sufficiently attractive to
assure broad-based enforcement litigation. One commentator has flatly stated: "An
award of $100 will not provide sufficient compensation for the costs in time, effort,
and possibly credit standing that a [TIL] litigant will incur." !Note, supra note 3,
at 104 (footnote omitted).
108. Of course, if the plaintiff is not successful in the action, neither attorney's
fees nor the cost of class notice will be reimbursed. See section 130(a) (3) of the
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a) (3) (Supp. V 1975).
109. Note, however, that any class member who does not opt out may, if he or
she desires, enter an appearance through counsel. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c) (2) (C). For
[VOL. 22
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it is not unfair to offer an aggrieved consumer the option of being a class
member with a potentially lesser recovery, so long as the consumer may
decline the invitation and pursue the individual remedy." 0
B. Incentive
While Chevalier suggests a solution to the problem of reduced re-
covery, it posits no answer to the problem of incentive."' In Chevalier,
the class representatives were willing to accept a lesser recovery than they
would have received had they sued individually." 2 It is unlikely, however,
that many will share the altruism of the Chevalier plaintiffs." 3 Further,
even when such a situation does arise, the spectre of misconduct by the
plaintiff's attorney is unavoidably present." 4
One method of avoiding the disincentive that arises when the class
representative is likely to recover less through class action than through
an individual suit 15 would be for the court to award the class representa-
tive the same amount in a successful class action that he or she would
have received in a successful individual suit.116 However, one court' has
questioned the fairness and adequacy of the class representation 1 7 where
the class representative receives more than his or her equal share. In
a discussion of the impact of this provision on the TIL class action, see Weathersby
v. Fireside Thrift Co., 5 CONS. CRED. GUIDE (CCH) ff 98,640, at 88,181, 22 FED. R.
SERV. 2d 44, 47 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 25, 1975) ; text accompanying notes 137-47 infra.
110. 72 F.R.D. at 153. Implicit support for this view may be found in section
130(h) of the Act, which provides in part:
A person may not take any action to offset any amount for which a creditor
is potentially liable to such person [under the Act] against any amount owing
to such creditor by such person, unless the amount of the creditor's liability to
such person has been determined by judgment of a court of competent jurisdic-
tion in an action to which such person was a party.
15 U.S.C. § 1640(h) (Supp. V 1975) (amending 15 U.S.C. § 1640 (1970)). The
thrust of section 130(h) is to prohibit an individual, who is not a party to a class
or individual action, from setting off the statutory penalty in reliance upon another's
judgment. Comment, supra note 3, at 1288-89; Comment, supra note 17, at 923-25.
Section 130(h) may be viewed as expressing the policy that the statutory penalties
provided in the Act are only meant to be enjoyed fully by those who expend the
time, money, and energy in litigating the TIL violation. To the extent that a class
member is relieved of that necessity, it is not unfair that he or she receive a lesser
recovery than the individual who brings an action and takes the risks.
111. See text accompanying notes 66-69 supra.
112. 72 F.R.D. at 152. One factor in the plaintiffs' decision to seek class recovery
for the TIL violation may have been the presence of various antitrust class claims.
Id. at 144-51.
113. .See notes 66-69 and accompanying text supra. In Rollins v. Sears, Roebuck
& Co., 21 FED. R. SERv. 2d 1088 E(.D. La. June 21, 1976), the court refused to certify
the class in the absence of an explanation for the plaintiff's "altruism." Id. at 1093.
114. See notes 70-74 and accompanying text supra.
115. See text accompanying notes 66-69 supra.
116. This proposal would somewhat ease the burden of an attorney in counseling
his or her client about the desirability of instituting a TIL class action. See text
accompanying notes 70-74 supra.
117. See text accompanying note 53 supra.
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Weathersby v. Fireside Thrift Co.,118 the consumer-plaintiff petitioned the
court to certify his TIL action as a class action" 9 and to authorize him to
recover the same amount in the class action as he would have recovered
had he brought an individual suit. 120 The United States District Court
for the Northern District of California denied the request. 1 2 1 The court
reasoned that if the plaintiff recovered more than his share, he would in
essence be receiving money that belonged to the rest of the class.1 22 Hence,
there was a fundamental antagonism between the interests of the plaintiff
and those of the class members, and the court held that he could not "fairly
and adequately" represent them.12
3
However, in Vickers v. Home Federal Savings & Loan Associa-
tion,124 a New York state court certified a TIL class action 125 even though
the plaintiff had requested the same advantage as had the plaintiff in
Weathersby.126 The decision in Vickers was limited to the narrow holding
that on a motion for class certification, a division of damages would be
premature. 127 However, in important dicta, the Vickers court suggested
that awarding the representative a greater recovery than the other mem-
bers of the class would not be inconsistent with the class action device.128
118. 5 CONS. CRED. GUIDE (CCH) 1 98,640, 22 FED. R. SERv. 2d 44 (N.D. Cal.
Feb. 25, 1975).
119. Id. at 81,179, 22 FED. R. SERV. 2d at 45.
120. Id. at 81,181, 22 FED. R. SnRv. 2d at 47.
121. Id., 22 FED. R. SERv. 2d at 48.
122. Id.
123. Id. The court dismissed an argument that class members could be protected
by the provision of rule 23 that allows class members to opt out of the class without
prejudice to their rights. Id. The Weathersby court, noting that the one-year statute
of limitations, 15 U.S.C. § 1640(e) (1970), had run, reasoned that there was no real
choice of opting out. 5 CoNs. CRED. GUIDE (CCH) 1 98,640, at 88,181, 22 FED. R.
SERv. 2d 44, at 47. For criticism of this position, see note 136 infra.
124. ___ Misc. 2d _, 386 N.Y.S.2d 291 (Sup. Ct. 1976).
125. Id. at .---, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 300. The class was certified under the recently
enacted New York class action statute, N.Y. Civ. PRAC. LAW §§ 901-909 (McKinney
1976). 386 N.Y.S.2d at 300. Although the Vickers court certified the class under
the state class action statute, its analysis is no less pertinent to the instant discussion.
The New York statute was derived in large part from federal rule 23. Farrell,
Civil Practice, 1975 Survey of New York Law, 27 SYRACUSE L. REV. 425 (1976).
Under the New York statute a class may be certified only if requirements of
numerosity, commonality, and typicality are satisfied. N.Y. CIv. PRAC. LAW § 901 (a)
(1)-(3) (McKinney 1976). In addition, the class representative must be able to
"fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class," and it must further appear
that a class action is superior to other methods of adjudicating the controversy.
Id. § 901(a) (4)-(5). For a discussion of the nearly identical requirements of
federal rule 23, see text accompanying notes 49-58 supra. It is to be noted that the
Vickers court relied almost exclusively upon federal cases to support its decision
to certify the plaintiff class under the New York statute. __ Misc. 2d _, 386
N.Y.S.2d at 296-300.
126. Id. at. -, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 298.
127. Id. at __, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 299.
128. Id. at .-- , 386 N.Y.S.2d at 299. The court stated: "[T]he fact that the
plaintiffs herein may be awarded damages under a different section of T-I-L than the
class members or that they may receive a somewhat larger monetary award is not
sufficient to render their representation inadequate." Id. at .-- , 386 N.Y.S.2d at 299.
[VOL. 22
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The court noted that the requirement that the representative adequately
protect the class has not meant that the representative's claim be the same
kind 12 9 or the same size'80 as the claims of the class members. It was
sufficient for the Vickers court that the class representative had, as a
practical matter, every interest in the success of the class claim.131
Aside from the persuasiveness of the Vickers decision, it is submitted
that the Weathersby analysis is fundamentally unsound. The Weathersby
court began its reasoning with the premise that each class member was
entitled to an equal share of the class recovery. 132 Given this premise, it
was undeniably correct to conclude that if the representative recovered
an amount greater than his or her share, the other class members would
receive less than their shares. The defect in the Weathersby analysis lies
not in the reasoning, but in the premise. Simply stated, the Act does not
provide that each class member is entitled to an equal share of the class
fund. Rather, the Act provides that in the case of a class action, the class
member may recover "such amount as the court may allow, except that
as to each member of the class no minimum recovery shall be appli-
cable. . . -13' The Act thus places the distribution of the class fund in
the discretion of the court.'3 The fact that the court may grant the repre-
sentative a recovery equivalent to the recovery an individual suit would
129. Id. at __, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 299.
130. Id. at , 386 N.Y.S.2d at 299.
131. Id. at , 386 N.Y.S.2d at 299. The court noted:[T]he nature of the defenses available to the defendant make it inevitable that
the plaintiffs will be obliged to prove, even if they sue individually, that the
defendant's procedures were inadequate because there were violations not only
as to the plaintiffs but as to many others, i.e., the class members, as well. Accord-
ingly, it may be reasonably concluded at this stage of the proceedings that the
interest of the plaintiffs is co-extensive with that of the proposed class members.
Id. at _, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 299.
132. 5 CONS. CRED. GUIDE (CCH) ff 98,640, at 88,181, 22 FED. R. SERv. 2d 44, 47(N.D. Cal. Feb. 25, 1975).
133. Section 130(a) (2) (B) of the Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a) (2) (B) (Supp. V
1975) (amending 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a) (1970)) (emphasis added).
134. Id. In exercising its discretion, the court should generally distribute damages
to the class members on a pro rata basis. See Eovaldi v. First Nat'l Bank, 5 CoNs.
CRED. GUIDE (CCH) fr 98,419 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 26, 1976). At least two methods of
distributing damages are possible. They may be illustrated by an example in which
the TIL class consists of 998 persons plus two class representatives, and the total
class recovery is $50,000. Assuming that the representatives would have recovered$100 apiece in an individual action and that the court awards them that same amount,$49,800 would remain for class distribution. The court could, under one method,
split the fund equally between the claimants, giving each class member a recovery
of $49.79. Under the second method, the court could give each class member a
percentage of the amount that he or she would have recovered in an individual
proceeding, just as unsecured creditors generally receive only a percentage of their
claims against the estate of a bankrupt. If the distribution of the class recovery
followed this method, the class members that would have recovered $250 in indi-
vidual actions would receive x percent of $250. Class members who would have
recovered only $100 in individual actions would receive x percent of $100. It islikely that the courts will generally opt for the first procedure because of its con-
venience. For a broad discussion of the mechanics of distributing a class recovery,
see generally Developments in the Law - Class Actions, 89 HARv. L. REv. 1319,
1523-36 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Developments].
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yield does not create an antagonism between the class and the representa-
tive. In principle it is fair that the representative get a somewhat greater
share of the recovery than the silent partner.13 5 Protection of the class
can be adequately insured by clearly explaining the different potential
recoveries in the class notice. This will allow objecting class members
the opportunity to opt out and pursue individual recovery. 13 6
If, as suggested above, it is proper for a court to award the class
representative the amount that he or she would have received in an
individual suit, 3 7 the question is posed whether intervenors l35 should
135. Antagonism between the class representative and the class members will
prevent certification of a class action only where the antagonism concerns the subject
matter of the suit. Berman v. Narragansett Racing Ass'n, 414 F.2d 311, 317 (Ist
Cir. 1969); Redmond v. Commerce Trust Co., 144 F.2d 140, 151 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 323 U.S. 776 (1944) ; Gates v. Dalton, 67 F.R.D. 621 (C.D. Cal. 1975). See
3B MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 23.07[3], at 23-403-04 (2d ed. 1976). The classic
illustration of a situation where the adverse interests of the class members and the
class representative do not interfere with class certification is the example of a
class action brought to preserve a trust fund. Even though the various class member-
beneficiaries may have different theories concerning the distribution of the trust,
especially if the fund is insufficient to pay all the claims in full, a class action is
nevertheless proper, as long as all the class members are primarily concerned with
preserving the trust fund. Redmond v. Commerce Trust Co., 144 F.2d 140, 151-52
(8th Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 776 (1944); 3B MOORE'S FEDERAL PRaCTICE
ff 23.07[3], at 23-403-04 (2d ed. 1976). See also FED. R. Civ. P. 23, Advisory Com-
mittee's Note (1966). In the TIL context, the primary concern of the class repre-
sentative, and that of each class member, is showing that the defendant's conduct
constituted a violation of the Act. With respect to this goal, there is classwide
solidarity. The fact that the class representative's interest is greater than the in-
terests of the class members does not prevent class certification. See First Am. Corp.
v. Foster, 51 F.R.D. 248, 250 (N.D. Ga. 1970).
136. One of the fundamental factors in the Weathersby court's refusal to certify
the TIL class was that the court did not believe that the opt-out provision of rule
23(c) (2) (A) would adequately protect the class. 5 CoNs. CRED. GUIDE (CCH) at
88,181, 22 FED. R. SERV. 2d at 47. However, the rationale for the court's belief was
that the statute of limitations had run on the claims of the class. Id. Therefore,
the ability to opt out of the class action afforded the class members no protection. Id.
However, recent interpretations of the 1974 Supreme Court decision in American
Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538 (1974), suggest that the TIL statute of
limitations, section 130(e) of the Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1640(e) (1970), is tolled by the
filing of a class action. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 414 U.S. 156, 176 n.13 (1974)
Agostine v. Sidcon Corp., 69 F.R.D. 437, 448 n.13 (E.D. Pa. 1975). See also Com-
ment, note 17 supra, at 921 n.103. If the Weathersby decision is read in light
of the court's belief that the class members had no viable choice of opting out of the
litigation because the statute of limitation had run, the decision is defensible. How-
ever, its logic is not persuasive where the opportunity to opt out and pursue indi-
vidual recovery is a meaningful alternative.
137. See text accompanying notes 111-36 supra.
138. There are two methods by which individuals may secure an active participa-
tory role in a rule 23(b) (3) class action. (In this context, "participation" is used
to mean an involvement in the class action greater than that of the ordinary silent
partner class member.) After receipt of the class notice, each class member who
does not opt out of the class may enter an appearance in the action through counsel.
FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c) (2). If earlier participation is desired, or if a nonmember
wishes to participate, rule 24(b) permits the court to allow an individual to intervene
in a pending action if the intervenors claim and the pending claim share a question
of law or fact. Id. 24(b). The difference between entering an appearance through
counsel under rule 23 and intervening under rule 24 is more theoretical than practical,
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receive similar treatment. In Weathersby, the court suggested that if the
intervenors substantially aid in the successful conclusion of the action,
it would be unfair to give them less than the original class representa-
tive. 13 9 However, if they receive more than the ordinary class member,
the court predicted a rush to the courthouse to intervene. 140
While the amount to be awarded to the individual class members is
vested in the discretion of the court,14 1 it is anticipated that ordinarily
only the class representatives 142 would be awarded the same recovery
that an individual suit would yield. It is further anticipated that the
court would limit the number of representatives to the minimum number
required to protect the class fairly and adequately.143 In some cases,
intervenors would become class representatives if their full participation
were needed to secure the adequate representation of the class. However,
it is expected that in the majority of cases, the intervenors would not
participate as class representatives, but would be afforded only a limited
participation in the litigation. They would have the opportunity, for
example, to receive copies of the pleadings and papers in the case and to
contribute to the discovery carried out by the class representatives.14
There are two reasons for treating the intervenors differently than the
class representatives with respect to ultimate recovery. First, as discussed
above, the class representative will have a greater participatory role than
the intervenor. Second, the principal reason for awarding a greater re-
covery to the class representative is to cure the disincentive to bring a
TIL class action. 145 Once the class action has been initiated, there is a
lesser need for encouraging participation.
because rule 23(d)(3) gives the court broad powers to impose conditions upon rule
24 intervenors. 3B MooRE's FEDERAL PRAcTIcE § 23.90[2], at 23-1621-23 (2d ed.
1976). These conditions may be used to limit the intervenor's rights to those of a
class member who enters an appearance by counsel. Id. The rights of a person
entering an appearance by counsel have been interpreted to include the opportunity
to view the papers of the class representative and to be fully informed of new
developments in the proceedings. Id.
For convenience, class members seeking participatory roles in a TIL class
action will herein be termed "intervenors," regardless of whether they intervene
under rule 24, or enter an appearance under rule 23. In the case where the court
grants an intervenor a full participatory role, the intervenor will herein be termed
a class representative. See text accompanying notes 142-44 infra.
139. 5 CoNs. CRED. Gum (CCH) at 88,181, 22 FED. R. SERV. 2d at 47.
140. Id.
141. Section 130(a) (2) (B) of the Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a) (2) (B) (Supp. V
1975) ; see text accompanying notes 133 & 134 supra.
142. See note 138 supra; text accompanying note 143 infra.
143. Indeed, in a TIL action, where the substantive issue of liability is likely to
be the same for every class member, a single class representative may often be
sufficient to represent the class fairly and adequately.
144. For a discussion of the power of the court to limit the participation of inter-
venors, see note 138 supra. Such power is constitutionally exercised so long as the
intervenor's interests are fairly and adequately represented. See Hansberry v. Lee,
311 U.S. 32 (1940). The alternative to allowing limited participation for intervenors
under rule 24(b) would be for the court to deny the motion to intervene. FED. R.
Civ. P. 23(b).
145. See notes 111-14 and accompanying text supra.
COMMENTS
22
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 22, Iss. 2 [1977], Art. 13
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol22/iss2/13
440 VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW [VOL. 22
It is submitted that inequity will rarely occur through this arrange-
ment. It is probable that the likelihood of a lower recovery in the class
action will encourage most individuals who are sufficiently motivated to
intervene to opt out in favor of an individual suit. The intervenor in a
successful suit will not lose anything by entering an appearance through
counsel since his or her attorney fees will be reimbursed. 146 However, in
the rare case where an intervening party makes a substantial contribution
to the success of the action and expends a like amount of time and energy
as the class representative, the court could use its discretion to award him
or her a greater share in the class recovery. 1 47
C. Multiple Classes
The problem created by the possibility of multiple TIL class actions
for the same violation has not yet reached the courts.148  However, if
several small class actions - rather than one large action - were insti-
tuted, and each successfully recovered the maximum penalty, the creditor
would face the same potentially disastrous liability as before the 1974
amendments. 149 The legislative history of the amendments indicates that
this result would frustrate the intent of Congress. While Congress' pri-
mary goal was to destroy the impediments to use of the class action de-
vice,150 there was also genuine concern that creditors might be bankrupted
by the enormous penalties originally possible under the Act. 15
In light of this situation, it has been argued that the creditor has the
right to insist that the plaintiff expand any artificially reduced class to>
146. Section 130(a) (3) of the Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a) (3) (Supp. V 1975).
147. See notes 133 & 134 and accompanying text supra.
148. See notes 75-78 and accompanying text supra.
149. See notes 31-40 and accompanying text supra.
150. See notes 41-47 and accompanying text supra.
151. The Senate Report on S. 2101, which contained the same civil liability pro-
visions that were ultimately passed in the 1974 amendments stated:
The purpose of the civil penalties section under Truth in Lending was to
provide creditors with a meaningful incentive to comply with the law without
relying upon an extensive new bureaucracy. However, the Committee feels this
objective can be achieved without subjecting creditors to enormous penalties
for violations which do not involve actual damages and may be of a technical
nature. Putting a reasonable limit on a creditor's maximum class action liability
would seem to be in the best interests of both creditors and consumers.
1973 SENATE REPORT, supra note 44, at 14-15. In discussing why the amendments
were made applicable to pending class actions which had already been certified, the
Senate report explained:
The Committee ... decided to apply these new provisions to pending lawsuits
which have not been finally decided. While the Committee would ordinarily be
hesitant to amend provisions involved in pending court cases, it feels that some
clarification is needed to avoid excessive judgments not intended by the original
Truth in Lending Act.
Id. at 15-16.
The House conference report accompanying H.R. 1121, the bill ultimately
enacted, stated tersely: "The limitation on class action suits was further limited to
the lesser of $100,000 or 1 percent of the net worth of the creditor to protect small
business firms from catastrophic judgments." H.R. REP. iNo. 1429, 93d Cong., 2d
Sess. 37, reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 6148, 6153.
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include all persons who received the same disclosure form.152 However,
if the plaintiff were always required to sue on behalf of every potential
member of the class, 153 it would be very difficult to locate a plaintiff with
incentive and resources sufficient to provide Eisen notice to all the members
of large plaintiff classes.154 This would create the anomaly of discouraging
class suits in precisely those cases where the violation was most widespread,
and the deterrent effect of class liability most needed.
152. LeValley & Walker, supra note 10, at 483-84, 490-92. The rationale of the
authors, however, is not clear. Basically, their argument rests upon rule 23 (b) (1) (A),
which provides that an action (which has met the prerequisites of 23(a)) may be
maintained as a class action if :
(1) the prosecution of separate actions by or against individual members
of the class would create a risk of(A) inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual members
of the class which would establish incompatible standards of conduct for the
party opposing the class....
FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b). The authors contend that 23(b) (1) (A) gives the defendant
a substantive right to oppose the certification of any artificially reduced class or to
force the plaintiff to expand the class to include all persons receiving the incorrect
disclosure. LeValley & Walker, supra note 10, at 490-92.
The problem with this contention is that rules 23(b) (1) (A) and 23(b) (3)
are parallel provisions which specify separate and independent grounds upon which a
class action may be maintained. Thus, to the extent that there is a danger of incon-
sistent individual suits, a class action may be maintained, not precluded, under
23(b) (1) (A). 3B MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 1 23.35[1], at 23-551-53 (2d ed.
1976). In such case, the action is maintained as a 23(b)(1) class action, not a
23(b)(3) class action. The distinction is important because if the action is main-
tained as a 23(b)(1) class action, class members are not permitted to opt out of
the action. Airline Stewards & Stewardesses Ass'n v. American Airlines, 490 F.2d
636, 642 (7th Cir. 1973). Nor need they receive individual notice. Larionoff v.
United States, 553 F.2d 1167, 1186 (D.C. Cir. 1976). LeValley and Walker appar-
ently do not contend that TIL class actions can be maintained under 23(b) (1) (A).
LeValley & Walker, supra note 10, at 483-84. Rather, they suggest that 23(b) (1) (A)
should somehow guide the decision of whether or not to certify the class under
23(b) (3). Id. It is submitted, however, that rule 23(b) (1) (A) is simply inappli-
cable when certification is sought under 23 (b) (3).
153. While the matter has seldom been considered, there may be limitations in-
herent in rule 23 on the freedom of the class representative to limit the class artifi-
cially. First, it is clear that the plaintiff class must be so large as to make joinder of
the members impracticable. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a) (1). Second, the rule requires that
there must in fact be a class and that the representative be a member of it. 3B
MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE ff 23.04 at 23-251, 23-254 (2d ed. 1976). While it is the
plaintiff's burden to allege the existence of the class, id. 1 23.02-[2], at 23-153, the
determination of whether the class described by the plaintiff is actually a class is a
question of law for the court. See id. When a group of individuals similarly affected
by the conduct of the defendant is reduced for purposes of the class action by de-
fining the class in terms which include an arbitrary qualification bearing no relationship
to the conduct of the defendant, a court might simply conclude that no "class" exists.
In Barrett v. Kunzig, 331 F. Supp. 266 (M.D. Tenn. 1971), a class action was
brought on behalf of a class of courthouse spectators to enjoin security personnel
from searching the briefcases of those entering a federal courthouse. Id. at 268.
Certification of the spectator class was denied on the grounds that, with respect to
the defendant's conduct, there was no reason to distinguish spectators from other
people entering the building. Id. It might be extrapolated from Barrett that rule 23
contemplates a class described by factors which exclude only individuals not similarly
situated with respect to the defendant's conduct. Beyond this, rule 23 itself offers
little guidance on the problem of class splitting.
154. For a brief discussion of the requirements of Eisen, see note 68 supra.
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It is submitted that there is a better approach to the problem. In
the ordinary case, where. the TIL class resides in a single geographical
area and is of a reasonable size, the court, in its discretion, may refuse
certification if the plaintiff does not seek to represent the entire potential
class. Yet such need not occur in every case. Section 130(b) of the
Act does not require that the maximum penalty be awarded in every class
action; rather, the section provides that in the case of a class action, the
court shall determine the appropriate award by considering all the relevant
factors, including "the number of persons adversely affected."' 55 Where
the plaintiff represents a class which does not include all those "adversely
affected" by the creditor's violation, the court should simply scale down
the award in proportion to the size of the entire potential class. The
broad power of the court to impose conditions on the class representative'5 6
and to strip the complaint of class allegations when necessary157 will
insure that classes are not fragmented in a manner that would unfairly
burden the defendant.158 :
D. Compulsory Counterclaims
Several approaches have emerged in dealing with the problems raised
by the interplay between the compulsory counterclaim rule' 59 and the
155. Section 130(a) of the Act provides in pertinent part:
In determining the amount of award in any class action, the court shall consider,
among other relevant factors, the amount of any actual damages awarded, the
frequency and persistence of failures of compliance by the creditor, the resources
of the creditor, the number of persons adversely affected, and the extent to which
the creditor's failure of compliance was intentional.
15 U.S.C. § 1640(a) (Supp. V 1975) (amending 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a) (170)).
Precedent for limiting the size of a plaintiff class in situations where a class
action would otherwise be unmanageable has been established in the antitrust area.
In Philadelphia Elec. Co. v. Anaconda Am. Brass Co., 43 F.R.D. 452 (E.D. Pa.
1968), the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania was
presented with a class action that potentially included in the plaintiff class "all state
and local governments in the United States." Id. at 461. Realizing the tremendous
difficulties involved in sending class notice and in managing such a prodigious class
action, the court limited the size of the plaintiff qlass by defining it in terms of
geography and population. Id. at 462. The court defined the plaintiff class to include:
1) all governmental entities in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania; 2) all state
governments; and 3) all cities in the United States with a population greater than
50,000. Id. See also P.D.Q., Inc. v. Nissan Motor Corp., 61 F.R.D. 372, 381 (S.D.
Fla. 1973) (plaintiffs unable to bear expense of notifying nationwide class; class
limited on a geographical basis).
156. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(d)'(3) ; see note 138 supra.
157. Rule 23(d) (4) allows the court to order that the "pleadings be amended to
eliminate therefrom allegations as to representation of absent persons, and that the
action proceed accordingly." FED. R. Civ. P. 23(d)(4). The purpose of such power
is to provide for "fair and efficient conduct of the action." Id. The court has wide
discretion in exercising this power. See 3B Mooa's FEDERAL PRAcTicE 23.70, at
23-1402 (2d ed. 1976).
158. Further, separate class actions can be consolidated for trial where there are
common issues of law or fact. FED. R. Civ. P. 42.
159. Rule 13 (a) provides in relevant part:
A pleading shall state as a counterclaim any claim which at the time of serving
the pleading the pleader has against any opposing party, if it arises out of the
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class action device. 160 As noted above, it has recently been held that a
creditor must counterclaim for delinquencies in the consumer plaintiff's
account or forever be barred from asserting that claim.1' 1 In a large
consumer class action, a federal court may view with dismay the necessity
of adjudicating numerous state law' debt claims and refuse to certify the
class action.' 6 2
One approach has been to ignore the literal wording of rule 13 and
hold that the creditor's counterclaim is not compulsory. In Agostine v.
Sidcon Corp.,' 63 the United States District Court for the Eastern District
of Pennsylvania reasoned that the state contract claims involved were
logically and legally distinct from the federal TIL claims and thus did not
arise from the same "transaction or occurrence" within the meaning of
the rule.' 64 The court was clearly influenced by policy considerations:
The purpose of the Act is to assure a meaningful disclosure of credit
terms so that consumers will be able to readily compare various
credit terms available to them and avoid the uninformed use of credit.
To allow [creditor's] counterclaims would effectively frustrate such a
purpose, by involving this court in a myriad of factual and legal ques-
tions that are logically unrelated to the alleged Truth in Lending
violations. 6 5
Not arising from the same "transaction or occurrence," the creditor's
counterclaims did not fall within the subject matter jurisdiction of the
court' 66 and were dismissed.1 67
A second approach to the problem is suggested by Donson Stores,
Inc. v. American Bakeries Co., 68 an antitrust action in which the plaintiffs
brought a class action for treble damages under section 4 of the Clayton
transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the opposing party's claim
and does not require for its adjudication the presence of third parties of whom
the court cannot acquire jurisdiction.
Id. 13(a).
160. See notes 82 & 83 and accompanying text supra.
161. Mims v. Dixie Fin. Corp., 21 FED. R. SERV. 2d 1042 (N.D. Ga. May 6, 1976)
(en banc) ; accord, Rollins v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 21 FED. R. SERV. 2d 1088 (E.D.
La. June 21, 1976). See also Comment, supra note 17, at 916-18 & n.72. For later
cases not following Minu and Rollins, see notes 163 & 164 and accompanying text
infra.
162. See, e.g., Crotchett v. Avis Rent A Car Sys., Inc., 56 F.R.D. 549, 552-53
(S.D.N.Y. 1972); Lah v. Shell Oil Co., 50 F.R.D. 198 (S.D. Ohio 1970). But see
Malby v. General Elec. Credit Corp., 61 F.R.D. 59 (N.D. Ohio 1973), where the
court was undaunted by the possibility of some 3,000 counterclaims. Id. at 61.
163. 69 F.R.D. 437 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
164. Id. at 442. See also Jones v. Sonny Gerber Auto Sales, Inc., 22 FED. R.
Stay. 2d 28 (D. Neb. Aug. 14, 1976) ; Buehler v. Citizens Fidelity Bank & Trust Co.,
22 FED. R. SERV. 2d 37 (W.D. Ky. March 2, 1976); Bloomer v. Household Cons.
Discount Co., 21 FrD. R. SERv. 2d 1256 (W.D. Pa. Jan. 19, 1976) ; Shriver v. Sears,
Roebuck & Co., 22 FED. R. SERV. 2d 36 (W.D. Pa. Jan. 16, 1976).
165. 69 F.R.D. at 442 (citation omitted).
166. See note 82 supra.
167. 69 F.R.D. at 443,
168. 58 F.R.D. 485 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
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Act.169 The defendant asserted counterclaims against various class mem-
bers other than the class representatives. 70 Arguing that rule 13 allows
counterclaims only against opposing parties' 7 ' and that class members
were not "parties" within the meaning of the rule, the plaintiffs moved to
dismiss the counterclaims.' 7 2 The United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York accepted the plaintiffs' contention, stating:
Rule 23 contemplates an adversary contest involving only the repre-
sentative members of the class, with all other members of the class
being permitted passively to await the outcome of the principal suit.
Therefore, in the absence of any reported decision holding that absent
class members are parties for the purpose of Rule 13, I hold that
they are not. In reaching this decision I note that in these cases the
right to counterclaim is readily subject to abuse as a tactical device
to encourage plaintiffs to opt out.' 3
Since the Donson decision rests upon an interpretation of rule 13, its
applicability is not limited to the antitrust area, but could be asserted in the
TIL area as well.' 7 4
169. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970).
170. 58 F.R.D. at 487.
171. Id.
172. Rule 13(a) requires compulsory counterclaims to be made against "any op-
posing party." FED. R. Civ. P. 13(a). Rule 13(b) allows other claims to be asserted
against "any opposing party." Id. 13(b). The plaintiffs' contention in Donson would
apply to any counterclaim, whether compulsory or permissive.
173. 58 F.R.D. at 489 ('footnote omitted).
174. An argument based upon Donson was raised and rejected in one TIL case.
Rollins v. Sears, Roebuck .& Co., 21 FED. R. Smav. 2d 1088, 1091 (ED. La. June 21,
1976). For a discussion of this aspect of the Rollins decision, see note 183 infra.
The one other decision to decide the question posed in Donson declined, without
discussion, to follow that court's reasoning. Weit v. Continental Ill. Nat'l Bank &
Trust Co., 60 F.R.D. 5, 8 (N.D. Ill. 1973). For further discussion of the Weit case,
see text accompanying notes 186-88 infra.
Interestingly, the question of whether class members are parties has come
up in other contexts. For example, in the discovery area, interrogatories may only be
served upon a "party." FED. R. Civ. P. 33(a). In Wainwright v. Kraftco Corp.,
54 F.R.D. 532 (N.D. Ga. 1972), it was held that interrogatories cannot be directed
to class members because they are not parties within the meaning of the rule. Id.
at 534; accord, Fisher v. Wolfinbarger, 55 F.R.D. 129 (W.D. Ky. 1971). Similarly,
a request for production of documents can only be served upon a "party." FED. R.
Civ. P. 34(a). In Brennan v. Midwestern United Life Ins. Co., 450 F.2d 999 (7th
Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 921 (1972), the court held that discovery of class
members was allowed in certain situations; however, the court did not decide whether
the class members were parties. See also Robertson v. National Basketball Ass'n,
67 F.R.D. 691 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). For a discussion of whether class members are
"parties" for other purposes, see In re Four Seasons Sec. Laws Litigation, 525 F.2d
500 (10th Cir. 1975) (class member not a party under rule 60(b) to challenge the
adequacy of settlement) ; Lamb v. United Sec. Life Co., 59 F.R.D. 44 (S.D. Iowa
1973) (class members not parties to the action and hence not potentially liable for
security for costs).
Still, the Supreme Court's decision in Zahn v. International Paper Co., 414
U.S. 291 (1973), which required each member of the plaintiff class to meet the
$10,000 amount in controversy requirement of 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1970), has been
interpreted to mean that each class member is a "plaintiff" in the action and thus
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A third approach to the problem was taken in Rollins v. Sears,
Roebuck & Co.'1 7 The defendant in Rollins, faced with a TIL class action,
asserted numerous counterclaims against members of the plaintiff class for
delinquencies in their accounts.'7 6 The Rollins court held that the state
law counterclaims were compulsory within the meaning of the federal rule
and thus were within the jurisdiction of the court.' 7 7 However, the court
saved the action from problems of unmanageability and lack of common-
ality by holding that class members who had counterclaims asserted against
them were to be dropped from the class. 17 8 Accordingly tailored, the class
presented no problem for certification. 179
None of the three approaches described above is free from difficulty.
The Agostine court seems to have ignored both the literal wording of
rule 138(a)10 and the broad interpretation traditionally given to the com-
pulsory counterclaim.' 8 ' The Donson decision is difficult to evaluate be-
a party to the suit. Local 194, Retail, Wholesale, & Dep't Store Union v. Standard
Brands, Inc., 22 FED. R. SERV. 2d 219, 222 (7th Cir. Aug. 24, 1976).
The case law was nicely summarized by the court in In re Four Seasons
Sec. Laws Litigation: "It is apparent from the decisions that absent class members
have been considered 'parties' for some purposes but not for others. The fact that
absent class members are bound by a judgment does not in itself provide an an-
swer.... ." 525 F.2d 500, 504 (10th Cir. 1975).
175. 21 FED. R. SERV. 2d 1088 (E.D. La. June 21, 1976).
176. Id. at 1089, 1092.
177. Id. at 1089. For a brief discussion of the relationship between the ancillary
jurisdiction of the federal courts and the compulsory counterclaim rule, see note 82
supra.
178. 21 FED. R. SERV. 2d at 1092. Of the 338 people in the class that the plaintiff
sought to represent, 36, or roughly 10%, were excluded. Id.
179. Id. It should be noted, however, that the class action in Rollins was dis-
allowed on other grounds. Apparently, the class representative in Rollins would have
recovered $427 by an individual suit, but only $331 in the class action. 21 FED. R.
SERV. 2d at 1093; see text accompanying notes 60-65 supra. Despite the fact that the
plaintiff was apparently a willing suitor, the court refused to certify the class action.
21 FED. R. SERv. 2d at 1093. The court stated that the certainty of a lesser recovery
for the plaintiff class representative "creates serious doubts about whether plaintiff
would be an adequate class representative because we cannot understand why plaintiff
wishes to pursue this as a class action. On this ground alone we refuse to certify this
suit as a class action without some adequate explanation for plaintiff's altruism."
Id.; see text accompanying notes 99-109 supra. Perhaps the court's ruling stemmed
from a fear that counsel had not properly advised the plaintiff of the lesser recovery.
See text accompanying notes 66-69 supra.
180. Rule 13(a) provides that a counterclaim is compulsory if it arises from the
same "transaction or occurrence" that is the subject matter of the plaintiff's claim.
FED. R. CIv. P. 13(a). In a TIL situation, both claims are rooted in a single credit
transaction. Liability for violation of the TIL Act arises at the very instant that
the debtor becomes obligated on the contract. Wachtel v. West, 476 F.2d 1062 (6th
Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 874 (1973). It seems difficult to say that the two claims
do not arise from the same "transaction." See Rollins v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.,
21 FED. R. SERv. 2d 1088 (E.D. La. June 21, 1976); Mims v. Dixie Fin. Corp., 21
FED. R. SERV. 1042 (N.D. Ga. May 6, 1976) (en banc); Kenney v. Landis Fin.
Group, Inc., 376 F. Supp. 852 (N.D. Iowa 1974).
181. Under that most widely cited test, a counterclaim is compulsory if it is
logically related to the plaintiff's claim. Great Lakes Rubber Corp. v. Herbert Cooper
Co., 286 F.2d 631 (3d Cir. 1961). In the usual case, both claims arise from the
debtor-creditor relationship. The proof of each claim will begin with the same
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cause it has potentially broad implications outside the area of TIL litiga-
tion.182 Moreover, two recent TIL decisions have narrowly read Donson
to apply only where the class members against whom the counterclaims
are asserted are unidentified. 83 Under this reading, Donson would be
meaningless in a TIL class action because the individual class members
with delinquent accounts are ordinarily easily identified by the creditor.8 4
Nor is the Rollins decision free from problems. Inflexibly applied, Rollins
would result in the unfortunate pruning of the plaintiff class even in cases
in which the counterclaims did not materially complicate the proceedings.S 5
However, if the Rollins approach is not applied inexorably, but is
reserved for those situations in which it is appropriate, it may present an
adequate solution to this dilemma. For example, in Weit v. Continental
Illinois Bank & Trust Co.,' 8 6 a credit card issuer, faced with an antitrust
class action, asserted numerous counterclaims against the class members.187
While the court held the counterclaims to be compulsory, it nevertheless
physical object: the written instrument which contains the contract and the TIL
disclosure statement. The claims are logically related in that they are each a part of
the complex of legal relations created by a single credit event.
182. As noted previously, Donson would apply regardless of whether the counter-
claim was permissive or compulsory. See note 172 supra. Since it is based upon an
interpretation of rule 13, it would apply regardless of the nature of the action at
issue - whether civil rights, Truth in Lending, or patent law, for example. See
text accompanying note 174 supra. Also, the decision of whether a class member
is a party will unavoidably have an impact upon a variety of procedural questions
besides the narrow one at issue in Donjon. See note 174 supra. The combination of
these factors suggests that the question will probably not be quickly resolved. Gen-
erally, however, it can be questioned whether the policy decision implicit in Donson
is wise. To the extent that the court prefers the policy of convenience which under-
lies the class action over the policy of convenience which underlies the counterclaim
rules, the court is saying, in essence, that the litigational convenience of the plaintiff
is of greater importance than that of the defendant. While this may be true in some
cases, there would seem to exist a number of cases wherein it would be unjust to
shield a plaintiff class member from the possibility of counterclaim.
183. Rollins v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 21 FED. R. SFav. 2d 1088, 1091 (E.D. La.
June 21, 1976) ; Turoff v. Union Oil Co., 61 F.R.D. 51, 59 (N.D. Ohio 1973).
It is suggested that Rollins and Turoff are based upon a misinterpretation of Donson.
While the defendant in Donson did not specify which of the plaintiff class members
the counterclaim was directed against, the court's decision that class members are
not parties was based upon its belief that class members are essentially silent partners
in the litigation controlled by the class representative. 58 F.R.D. at 489; see the
quotation from Donson in text accompanying note 173 supra.
184. See, e.g., Eovaldi v. First Nat'l Bank, 57 F.R.D. 545 (N.D. Ill. 1972)
(members of a class of 170,000 identifiable from defendant's records).
185. Under the Rollins approach, the class members with counterclaims asserted
against them would be dropped as a condition to the certification of the class. Thus,
the individuals who were dropped would not receive class notice. In many cases, they
would never learn of the TIL violation or would learn of it only after the one-year
statute of limitations, 15 U.S.C. § 1640(e) (1970), had run against the TIL claim.
186. 60 F.R.D. 5 (N.D. Ill. 1973).
187. Id. at 7.
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allowed the class action to proceed without dropping the class members
against whom counterclaims were asserted:
We find . . .that the plaintiff classes are not rendered unmanageable
by such counterclaims. In the case at bar, they would consist solely
of liquidated amounts owed by class members on their delinquent
accounts. These could best be ascertained from the defendant's own
records. Few class members would be expected to contest either the
fact of liability or the amount owed. This court would not be trans-
posed into a vast "collection agency" as defendants suggest, because
if a counterclaim exceeded a class member's damages, the pertinent
defendant would merely be in possession of a judgment for the dif-
ference, which it would then be able to enforce by normal proce-
dures.' s8
The reasoning of the Weit court would be applicable to many TIL cases,
especially those in which the defendant is a credit card issuer, a finance
company, or a bank loan department. On the other hand, where the de-
fendant is a vendor, or where, for any other reason, a number of delinquent
accounts may be expected to be contested, the Rollins approach of paring
down the class may be necessary. 189
V. "THE CONCLUSION, IN WHICH NOTHING IS CONCLUDED"'19 0
It is submitted that the TIL class action presents no insoluble prob-
lem to the federal judiciary. While the class action device poses certain
inherent difficulties, 191 it nonetheless can be effectively coupled with the
civil penalty provisions of the TIL Act in order to enforce the substantive
policies which underlie the Act.
First, although the 1974 amendments to the Act carry the potential
to reduce the recovery of class members in a substantial number of situa-
tions, certification of TIL classes need not be refused. As long as class
members are advised of the possible reduction in potential recovery and
given a meaningful opportunity to opt out and pursue individual redress,
the class is sufficiently protected. 192 This conclusion is based upon the
recognition that it is not unfair to provide a limited recovery for the
188. Id. at 8.
189. An even better result could be achieved through legislation similar to that
found in the proposed Uniform Class Action Act. The proposed Act suspends the
compulsory counterclaim rule in the class action context and requires the defendant
to secure leave of the court to plead counterclaims against members of the plaintiff
class. UNIFORM CLASS ACTIONS ACT § 11(a), (d), (f) (1976 Draft).
190. S. JOHNSON, The History of Rasselas, in RASSELAS, POEMS, AND SELECTED
PROSE 708 (3d ed. 1971).
191. The presence of procedural difficulties with the post-1974 TIL class action
is not surprising. The class action provisions of the 1974 amendments were unique
when they were enacted. See Developments, supra note 134, at 1530-31.
192. See text accompanying notes 99-109 supra.
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silent partners in a class action so long as they have the opportunity to
actively seek the greater individual recovery.1
9 3
Second, the TIL Act vests a certain discretion in the courts to dis-
tribute the class recovery. 194 While this discretion must be exercised
in a manner not inconsistent with rule 23, it is broad enough to permit
a court to award the class representative damages in the amount he or she
would have recovered by individual suit.'9 5 Such an award would have
the positive effect of helping to diminish the disincentive to sue on behalf
of a TIL class that was inadvertently created by the 1974 amendments.'
96
Further, the award would help to remove the spectre of professional mis-
conduct present whenever an individual sues on behalf of a TIL class
and risks a recovery less than the amount assured by a successful indi-
vidual suit.'
97
Third, the potential problem of multiple TIL class actions for the
same violation can be avoided by generally requiring the class representa-
tive to include in a single class all persons similarly situated with respect
to the defendant's conduct.198 However, when the expense of notification
of a nationwide class would otherwise prohibit a full class action, the
court may allow the plaintiff to limit the class to a more reasonable size.
In such a case, the court would scale down any class recovery in accordance
with the size of the class.199
Fourth, if it is ultimately accepted that a creditor's counterclaim to
a TIL action is compulsory, and hence within the ancillary jurisdiction
of the federal courts, the class action can remain an effective TIL enforce-
ment device. In many cases the counterclaims will not be of a nature that
will extensively involve the federal court in disputed local collection
suits. 20 0 However, where such possibility exists, the court can protect the
viability of the class by trimming from it those members against whom
counterclaims are asserted.201
In summary, then, the TIL class action can be maintained in federal
court. Yet, in a sense, this conclusion is no conclusion at all. The deci-
sion whether to certify a class action is committed to the discretion of the
trial court. 20 2 The soft terminology of rule 23 makes it difficult to reverse
193. See notes 110 & 130 supra.
194. See notes 133 & 134 and accompanying text supra.
195. See notes 133-36 and accompanying text supra.
196. See notes 66-69 and accompanying text supra.
197. See notes 70-74 and accompanying text supra.
198. See notes 138-43 and accompanying text supra.
199. See notes 144-58 and accompanying text supra.
200. See notes 186-88 and accompanying text supra.
201. See notes 174-79 & 189 and accompanying text supra.
202. In Postow v. Oriental Bldg. Ass'n, 390 F. Supp. 1130 (D.D.C. 1975), the
United States District Court for the District of Columbia stated that the 1974 amend-
ment to the Act "by no means requires or even recommends class action, but properly
leaves such determination to the sound discretion of the courts." Id. at 1140. See
generally 7A C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1785
(1972).
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the initial determination of the trial judge.2 03 While this Comment con-
cludes that the judge may certify a TIL class, it does not address the
overriding question of whether he or she should do so.
On the one hand, there are some strong indications that the class
suit is a needed tool of TIL enforcement. Administrative enforcement
has been disappointing in the first nine years of Truth in Lending.20 4
While the individual suit has flourished in certain areas,20 5 there is still
a widespread lack of grassroots litigation encouraging creditor compli-
ance.2 0 6 A number of factors operate to discourage individual suit. Most
obvious among them are the highly technical nature of the Act and the
short statute of limitations.2 0 7 Somewhat less apparent, but often determina-
tive, is the fact that the ongoing nature of the credit relationship make is diffi-
cult for the individual to institute suit. The risk of a bad credit rating or of
the creditor's refusal to service the product bought yesterday is greater
than the lure of the minimum damages. 208 For a number of people, the
203. Goldman v. First Nat'l Bank, 532 F.2d 10, 14-15 (7th Cir.), 45 U.S.L.W.
3254 (Oct. 5, 1976); Haynes v. Logan Furn. Mart, Inc., 503 F.2d 1161 (7th Cir.
1974).
204. Testifying before the Senate Subcommittee on Consumer Affairs in support
of the 1976 amendments raising the ceiling on class action recovery (see note 13
supra), a spokesperson for the FTC stated:
The [FTC's] resources are very, very inadequate to enforce legislation such
as truth in lending . . . where you have about a million creditors ...
If [the] laws provide for substantive civil liability, this greatly relieves the
government from having to do what it really hasn't got the capacity to do in the
first place, that is, insure full compliance with these statutes.
This is primarily why we advocate raising the ceiling on the amount of
possible civil liability....
1975 Senate Consumer Leasing Act Hearings, supra note 32, at 225 (testimony of
Sheldon Feldman).
205. It is interesting to note that most TIL litigation has been concentrated in
only a few judicial districts in the United States. The district with the most extensive
history of TIL litigation is the Northern District of Georgia. Between July 1973 and
February 1976, TIL suits constituted an incredible 25.6% of all civil cases filed in
that district. 1976 Senate Qui Tam Hearings, supra note 14, at 416-17. During the
spring of 1974, TIL cases amounted to almost 35% of the civil business of that juris-
diction. Id. For a fascinating explanation of this phenomenon, see id. at 409-54
(statement and testimony of Rhett Tanner).
206. TIL violations occur quite frequently at the bottom of the economic ladder.
During the 1976 hearings before the Senate Subcommittee on Consumer Affairs,
representatives from the National Consumer Law Center estimated that some 65% of
the contracts that come to the attention of Legal Services attorneys contain TIL viola-
tions. 1976 Senate Qui Tam Hearings, supra note 14, at 369 (statement of Wendy
W. Schiller, National Consumer Law Center, Boston, Mass.). To the extent that the
poor consumer deals with small, thinly capitalized creditors, the class action provides
little relief. The limitation on class recovery to one percent of net worth effectively
forecloses class remedies on this level.
207. See Comment, supra note 17, at 913.
208. In Haynes v. Logan Furn. Mart, Inc., 503 F.2d 1161 (7th Cir. 1974), the
Seventh Circuit certified a TIL class action, noting that, in this respect, a class action
would in many cases prove to be superior to individual suits. The court stated:
[N]o particular perceptiveness of modern society is needed for an awareness of
a fact of life lying in the virtually perpetual monthly payment program of many
1976-19771 COMMENTS 449
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institution of an unprovoked suit would simply be bad manners. The
defects in administrative and individual enforcement underscore the need
for a broadly based enforcement device that would concentrate the little
stings of individual suits into one large deterrent bite without demanding
the full commitment of the consumer that is required by an individual
suit.20 9
On the other hand, creditors have made convincing arguments that
Truth in Lending has become so overburdened with technicalities that
only the largest creditors can afford to comply with its provisions.210
Indeed, the regulations, already quite extensive, are constantly being sup-
families. As balances owing decline new purchases occur. The individual if
aware at all of his claim under the Act is bound to have some reluctance to sue
in his own name the supplier with whom he continues to do business and one
who could be in a position to visit harsh remedies on the buyer in the event of a
subsequent default.
Id. at 1165.
209. In Agostine v. Sidcon Corp., 69 F.R.D. 437 (E.D. Pa. 1975), the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania rejected a creditor's
argument that the TIL class action was unnecessary because the Act creates sufficient
incentive for individual suit to ensure the Act's enforcement. The court stated:
The argument that the incentive for individual litigation necessitates a finding
of non-superiority assumed that the minimum damage provision relates solely to
consumer motivation to sue rather than a deterrent to creditors. While such may
have been the case prior to the amendments to § 16 40(a), Congress, in so amend-
ing, recognized that courts were not certifying class actions and that there was a
need to encourage voluntary creditor compliance via potential class action lia-
bility. . . . [T]o deny class action status in all Truth in Lending cases . . .
would have the effect of nullifying what Congress attempted to do by amending
§ 1640(a). . . . While costs and reasonable attorney's fees might provide an
incentive to litigate where an alleged violation can be defined as an isolated in-
cident, such is not the case where, as here, there are hundreds of alleged viola-
tions almost all of which will go unremedied but for a class action.
Id. at 447.
210. During the 1976 oversight hearings on the consumer protection activities of
several federal agencies, numerous creditor representatives testified that compliance
with the Act has become too difficult and expensive. For example, the representative of
the American Retail Federation testified:
By way of summary, let me reiterate that retailers - indeed, I am sure all
creditors - want to comply with the law. However, any such law should be
capable of compliance, not just by the large creditors with access to lawyers
trained in this special field, but by all creditors subject to its provisions.
While I cannot speak personally for any company, I feel that it is a safe
assumption to say that none of the large, multistate retailers is going to be forced
out of business by complex regulations. They have . . . the resources to com-
ply. . . . It is the small merchant who is paying proportionately the highest price
for compliance with complex regulations, and it is the small merchant who is
most likely to be damaged.
1976 Senate Administrative Enforcement Hearings, supra note 23, at 153-54 (testi-
mony of Milton W. Schober).
Two commentators have recently written in their treatise: "In a nutshell,
Truth-In-Lending has become a trap for the unwary; and most little merchants will
probably not come into compliance until they have been caught a couple of times."
B. CLARK & J. FONSECA, supra note 18, at 91 (Cum. Supp. 1976).
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plemented.21 ' The creditors argue that it is unfair to subject them to the
potentiality of class liability in such a complicated and fluid area.
212
The history of our jurisprudence shows that when the basic regu-
latory scheme becomes unfair, courts will utilize procedural difficulties
as a shield for those treated unfairly by the statute. To some extent this
has been true of Truth in Lending.213 It is believed that if Congress sim-
plifies the technical substance of the Act, the procedural problems that
have arisen around the enforcement devices will dissipate. However, the
converse is also true: if Congress allows the complexities of the Act to
multiply, no new enforcement device will be free from difficulty.
Joseph A. Dworetzky
211. The possibility of overregulation is compounded by the fact that the Truth
in Lending Act is only one part of a matrix of recent federal statutes regulating the
credit industry. See The Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1691a-1691e
(Supp. V 1975) ; The Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681a-1681t (1970) ;
The Fair Credit Billing Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1666a-1666j (Supp. V 1975); and the
Consumer Leasing Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-240, §§ 2-6, 90 Stat. 257 (1976). One
of the difficulties created by frequent changes in the statutory scheme and the regula-
tions supporting the statutes is that creditors do not have time to have new forms
designed and printed, and train personnel adequately in their use. See 1796 Senate
Administrative Enforcement Hearings, supra note 23, at 152 (statement of Milton W.
Schober).
212. During the 1976 hearings on the qui tam alternative to the class action
device, a representative of the Consumer Bankers Association summed up the matter
as follows: "It is, in our view, totally unfair, even unconscionable, to award $500,000
for an act, not really bad, that was committed despite the retention of suitable legal
and programming specialists." 1976 Senate Qui Tam Hearings, supra note 14, at 294
(testimony of Glen Hodges).
213. During the 1976 Qui Tam Hearings, Judge Sidney 0. Smith, Jr., the Chief
Judge of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia from
1968 to 1974, made a statement to the Senate Subcommittee on Consumer Affairs.
During the period of Judge Smith's tenure, the 'Northern District of Georgia received
a greater number of TIL cases than any other district in the country. See note 205
supra. Judge Smith stated:
It was my experience that many, if not the great majority of [TIL] cases, were
brought on the basis of allegations of hypertechnical violations of an extremely
complicated law where logical arguments could be made by lawyers on either
side of the case. This area of the law is so technical that the most conscientious
judges frequently reach directly opposite opinions with respect to the same alleged
violation....
It is indeed difficult for a creditor in the utmost good faith and in the exer-
cise of due diligence to prepare credit contracts which may not later be held
in violation of the Truth-in-Lending Act by some court in the federal judiciary.
It would seem that we need to work toward some solution which would allow
a reasonable and fair way for creditors to work toward meaningful disclosure
of the credit terms.
1976 Senate Qui Tam Hearings, supra note 14, at 342-43 (statement of Judge Sidney
0. Smith, Jr.).
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